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IV, JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal and cross-
appeal pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a), U.C.A. §§ 78-2-2(3)(j) & (4), 
and U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
V, STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A. STRINGAM'S ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in failing to bind Myers to Stringam's 
$104,211.74 tender offer pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-27-3 because Myers did not provide an 
alternate amount at the time he objected to the tender offer. "The proper interpretation of 
a statute is a question of law which we review for correctness, according no deference to 
the [district court's] legal conclusion." State v. Redd. 1999 UT 108 f 10, 385 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 23 (citations omitted). 
This issue was properly preserved for appeal. (Rec. at 87, 109, 1018 and 1026). 
An issue is preserved for appeal if the issue was raised and if the district court had an 
opportunity to consider the issue. Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n. 945 P.2d 125, 
129-30 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
2. Whether the district court erred when it reduced Stringam's award of 
attorney fees without a finding that Stringam's attorney fees were unreasonable. 
"Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court, 
and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. 
However, an award of attorney fees must be supported by evidence in the record." Dixie 
STRINGAM APPELLATE BRIEF Page 1 of 50 
State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1988) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). This issue was properly reserved for appeal. (Rec. at 991 & 
1048). 
B. STRINGAM'S ISSUES THAT HAVE ARISEN 
IN THE COURSE OF THIS APPEAL 
1. Whether Myers' appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to 
Myers' faulty service of his Notice of Appeal on Stringam. Lack of jurisdiction is a 
defense that may be raised at any time. See Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n. 814 
P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 1991). See also Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2). 
2. Whether the Court should strike Myers' August 1, 2000, letter citing 
supplemental authority because it violates Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(i). 
3. Whether the Court should decline to consider Myers' Appellate Brief 
because it violates the content and formatting requirements of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, specifically Rule 24. 
C. ISSUES THAT MYERS RAISED IN HIS APPELLATE BRIEF 
1. Whether the district court properly refused to grant Myers' Post-trial 
Motions. If the Court concludes that Myers' Post-trial Motions were made pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), then the standard of review is abuse of discretion. 
Van Per Stappen v. Van Per Stappen. 815 P.2d 1335, 1337, 166 Utah Adv. Rep. 58 
(Utah App. 1991). The same standard applies if the Court concludes that Myers' Motions 
were made under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Roundv v. Stalev. 984 P.2d 404, 406, 
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374 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah App. 1999) (applying the abuse of discretion standard of 
review to the denial of plaintiff s motion for a new trial pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59). Myers raises this issue here for the first time since the conclusion of the 
district court action. 
2. Whether the district court correctly determined that the agreement was 
ambiguous and whether the court's subsequent admission of extrinsic evidence to assist 
in the interpretation of the agreement was proper. "Whether an ambiguity exists in a 
contract is a question of law which we review for correctness." Sprouse v. Jager. 806 
P.2d 219, 221-22, 153 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Jarman v. Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising Co., 794 P.2d 492, 494 (Utah App. 1990)). However, "[questions 
of intent as determined by extrinsic evidence are questions of fact to be decided by the 
trier of fact and are subject to the 'clearly erroneous1 standard of review." Id (citing 
Fitzgerald v. Corbett 793 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1990)). 
3. Whether the parties' appeal from the Addendum to Final Judgment and 
Order is proper where the district court did not award to Stringam a sum-certain amount 
of attorney fees but instead awarded fees from a specific date. The standard of review 
here is correctness. Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 
1991). 
4. Whether Stringam can appeal from the Final Order and Judgment and from 
the Addendum to Final Judgment and Order even though she was found to be the 
prevailing party in the district court action. Because this issue does not require the Court 
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to review a district court finding or conclusion, there is likely no applicable standard of 
review. However, if the Court reviews this issue, it should review conclusions of law for 
correctness, State v. Green. 2000 UT App 33 ^  5, and findings of fact for clear error, Bell 
v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545,-547, 121 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah App. 1989). 
5. • Whether the district court erred in allowing Stringam to tender $109,000 to 
the district court pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-27-4 as payment of the balloon payment. The 
standard of review is correctness. State v. Redd. 1999 UT 108 % 10, 385 Utah Adv. Rep. 
23. 
IMPORTANT NOTE: Besides the five issues enumerated above, Myers has 
raised eight other issues in his various appellate level documents. See Myers' Docketing 
Statement1, Motion to Dismiss2, and Response to Stringam5 s Motion for Summary 
Disposition of All Issues3. The Court should summarily dismiss all of the other issues 
*Myers raised the following issues in his Docketing Statement: (1) Whether the 
trial court erred in issuing an Addendum to the Final Judgment and Order; (2) Whether 
the Addendum to Final Judgment and Order was entered in violation of Myers' Fifth 
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights; (3) Whether Myers may 
raise new issues under his theory that a judgment is not final and binding until affirmed 
on appeal; (4) Whether the award of attorney fees to Stringam was proper; and (5) 
Whether the district court erred in refusing to find that Stringam breached the Agreement 
and in refusing to grant Myers' relief of quiet title, damages and eviction. 
2Myers raised the following issues in his Motion to Dismiss: (1) Whether 
Stringam's cross-appeal should be dismissed because Stringam did not designate in her 
Docketing Statement the exact issues she was appealing; and (2) Whether Stringam can 
appeal from an order that her attorney prepared at the request of the district court. 
3In Myers' Response to Stringam's Motion for Summary Disposition of All Issues 
he states that "[t]his response will, to some extent, follow the order of points seemingly 
raised by appellee Stringam's attorneys in their motion. Beyond that it will more 
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that Myers has raised over the course of this appeal because he failed to raise them in his 
Appellate Brief. Stringam raises this argument here because it is unclear whether the 
Court will consider all issues now. (See June 14, 2000, Order Denying and Deferring 
Motions for Summary Disposition, stating, " IT IS HEREBY ORDERED . . . that the 
issues raised are deferred until plenary presentation and consideration of the case.") 
VL DETERMINATIVE LAW 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
None 
B. STATUTES 
1. U.C.A. § 78-27-3. See Addendum attached. 





VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE 
This case arises out of a real estate lease/purchase agreement ("Agreement") where 
resemble an original motion to reverse." (Rec. at Response to Summary Disposition, 
page 2, Tf 3). Myers raised the following issue in his Response: Whether the trial court 
erred in refusing to grant Myers' Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) Motion to Dismiss. 
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Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Jeannie Stringam ("Stringam") sought to exercise her 
option to purchase the real estate in question ("Home") and requested that 
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee Morris Myers ("Myers") provide her with a balloon 
payment amount on the Agreement and that he allow her to purchase the Home. Myers 
refused to do either, so after several offers Stringam filed suit and eventually tendered a 
balloon payment to Myers based on her calculations of the amount due. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. On February 3, 1997, Stringam filed a complaint against Myers seeking the 
following remedies: (a) specific performance in the acceptance of Stringam's tender to 
pay the underlying trust deed note in its entirety ("balloon payment"); (b) declaratory 
judgment stating that the sale of the Home was a condition precedent to the division of 
proceeds exceeding $109,000 and that Stringam was entitled to purchase the Home; and 
(3) that title in the Home be quieted to Stringam. (Rec. at 9). 
2. Myers filed his first Answer on February 25, 1997, in which he denied 
every allegation and set forth three counter-claims, among which were: (1) that the 
Agreement was a joint venture that required the Home be sold to a third party; (2) that he 
had suffered $100,000 in damages; and (3) that Stringam breached her fiduciary duty to 
him by refusing to sell the home to a third party. (Rec. at 16). 
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3. On March 5, 1997, Stringam filed her Motion to Strike Myers' Answer and 
Enter His Default, or in the alternative Motion for More Definite Statement and 
Plaintiffs Answer to Defendant's Counterclaims. (Rec. at 27). 
4. On March 20, 1997, through counsel Larry Whyte, Myers filed his Motion 
for Leave to Amend Answer and Counterclaim. (Rec. at 32). 
5. On April 29, 1997, with Stringam's consent, (Rec. at 55), Myers filed an 
amended Answer and Counterclaim. (Rec. at 69). 
6. On April 29, 1997, Stringam answered Myers' counterclaims. (Rec. at 81). 
7. On July 31, 1997, Stringam filed a Motion to Allow Substitute Performance 
and Offer to Tender Balance to Court, requesting: (1) that Myers accept $104,211.74 as 
payment in full of the balloon payment; and (2) that the district court allow her to tender 
the $104,211.74 to the court pending the outcome of the case. (Rec. at 87). 
8. On August 18, 1997, Myers filed his Objection to Allow Substitute 
Performance, claiming that Stringam's offer was untimely and incorrect in its amount, but 
failing to provide an alternate amount. (Rec. at 93). On September 24, 1997, Stringam 
filed her Response to the Objection. (Rec. at 109). 
9. On October 1, 1997, oral arguments were held before the district court at 
which time the court found that Stringam had attempted to tender her offer to Myers and 
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ordered Stringam to tender $109,000 to the court. (Rec. at 110). The district court issued 
its ruling in a memorandum decision on or about October 27, 1997, (Rec. at 125), and in 
a November 10, 1997, Order (Rec. at 158). 
10. On October 16, 1997, Stringam filed her Motion for Expedited Declaratory 
Relief Requiring Defendant to Tender Title into Court. (Rec. at 116). 
11. On October 31, 1997, Myers filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
for Expedited Declaratory Relief Requiring Defendant to Tender Title into Court. (Rec. 
at 135). 
12. On November 6, 1997, Stringam filed her Reply to Myers9 Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Expedited Declaratory Relief Requiring Defendant to Tender 
Title into Court, in which she stated that she would be willing to pay $134,000 if Myers 
could provide good title to the Home. (Rec. at 155). 
13. In a December 1, 1997, district court hearing, the district court allowed 
Stringam to withdraw the $109,000 from the court, and ordered her to pay the monthly 
mortgage payments on the Home, i.e. $1,038.00. (Rec at 161 & 165). On December 16, 
1997, Stringam withdrew the $109,000 from the district court. (Rec. at 166). 
14. On March 10, 1998, Stringam filed a Motion to Amend Complaint and 
Name Additional Parties after she learned through discovery that Erin Stovall and John 
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Patrick Stovall possibly still had an interest in the Home. (Rec. at 201). 
15. On March 13, 1998, Myers filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, claiming 
that Stringam had defaulted on the Agreement by not paying him the balloon payment on 
or before the August 31, 1997, deadline. (Rec. at 224). Stringam subsequently filed a 
Rule 56(f) Motion to Conduct Additional Discovery, requesting that she be allowed an 
extension of time to conduct further discovery before being required to oppose Myers' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Rec. at 283). 
16. On March 10, 1998, Stringam filed her Amended Complaint, naming Erin 
Stovall and John Stovall as defendants (Rec. at 279), and on March 20, 1998, the court 
signed the order allowing Stringam to amend her Complaint (Rec. at 264). 
17. On May 18, 1998, a Default Certificate was entered against Erin Stovall for 
her failure to answer the Amended Complaint (Rec. at 334), which was subsequently 
withdrawn because Erin Stovall filed an Answer on May 14, 1998 (Rec. at 332). 
18. On March 25, 1998, Myers filed his Objection to Motion to Amend 
Complaint, claiming that the Stovalls had no interest in the Home. (Rec. at 281). 
19. On May 4, 1998, Myers and Larry Whyte both submitted notices that Larry 
Whyte was withdrawing as Myers' counsel. (Rec. at 316 & 317). 
20. Also on May 4, 1998, Myers submitted a Notice of Withdrawal of 
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Summary Judgment. *(Rec. at 318). 
21. On May 8, 1998, Myers filed his Answer to Stringam's Amended 
Complamt, claiming: (1) that Stringam forfeited her rights in the Home when she failed to 
make the balloon payment; and (2) that he was the only person with an ownership interest 
in the Home. (Rec. at 320). 
22. On June 28, 1998, Myers filed yet another Answer to Amended Complaint 
in which he counterclaimed: (1) that title in the Home be quieted to him because Stringam 
did not tender the balloon payment to him; and (2) that Stringam be evicted with damages 
awarded to Myers for Stringam's "unlawful detainer." (Rec. at 346). 
23. On July 14, 1998, Stringam filed her Objection to Filing of and Motion to 
Strike Myers Second Amended Answer because Myers had already answered the 
Amended Complaint on May 8, 1998. (Rec. at 352). 
24. On July 28, 1998, Myers filed his Reply to Stringam's Objection to Filing 
of and Motion to Strike Myers Second Amended Answer. (Rec. at 358). 
25. On September 14, 1998, John Stovall filed his Answer to Stringam's 
Amended Complaint. (Rec. at 369). Stringam answered John Stovall's counterclaims on 
October 2, 1998. (Rec. at 385). 
26. On September 22, 1998, Myers and John Stovall filed their Joint Motion for 
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Summary Judgment. (Rec. at 373). 
27. Stringam subsequently filed a Rule 56(f) Motion to Conduct Additional 
Discovery in Order to Supplement her Opposition to the Joint Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (Rec. at 391). On October 26, 1998, the district court granted Stringam's 
Rule 56(f) Motion, allowing Stringam until December 1, 1998, to answer the Joint 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Rec. at 432). 
28. In an October 7, 1998, hearing, the parties stipulated to allow Myers to 
amend his Answer again. (Rec. at 411 & 442) 
29. However, the district court ordered that no further amendments to pleadings 
would be allowed unless Stringam learned that other entities owned interest in the Home. 
(Rec. at 411 & 442) 
30. On October 16, 1998, a Notice to Submit the Joint Motion for Summary 
Judgment was filed. (Rec. at 423). 
31. On December 1, 1998, Stringam filed a Supplemental Memo in Opposition 
to the Motion for Summary Judgment, stating that the nature of the Agreement was in 
dispute, which raised material issues of fact. (Rec. at 482). 
32. On December 24, 1998, Stringam filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Myers, stating that Myers could not assert a greater right to the Home that what 
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he had received from John Stovall. (Rec. at 521). Also on December 24, 1998, Stringam 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against John Stovall. (Rec. at 545). 
33. On December 28, 1998, Stringam filed her Offer of Judgment, offering 
$150,000. (Rec. at 570). 
34. On January 25, 1999, Erin Stovall's counsel submitted a Motion to 
Continue the trial. (Rec. at 604). On February 4, 1999, the district court granted the 
motion, and set trial for April 30, 1999, and May 3, 1999. (Rec. at 609 & 615). 
35. Without notice to Stringam, Myers filed an application to the court clerk for 
Certification of Default (Rec. at 591) for Stringam's failure to answer one of his 
counterclaims, raised in his fourth and final answer. Default was entered on February 3, 
1999, (Rec. at 610), even though the district court had ordered that no further 
amendments to pleadings would be allowed (Rec. at 443). 
36. On March 24, 1999, Stringam filed her Motion to Set Aside Default (Rec. 
at 729), stating that she was not served with notice of Myers's intent to seek default, and 
that it was the understanding of Stringam's counsel that no further pleadings were to be 
filed (Rec. at 624, 6221f 11). 
37. On March 24, 1999, and April 5, 1999, Stringam answered (Rec. at 733) 
and replied (Rec. at 741) to Myers' fourth and final Amended Answer and 
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Counterclaims. 
38. On March 29, 1999, Myers filed his Memo in Opposition and Objection to 
Stringam's Motion to Set Aside Default. (Rec. at 735). 
39. In a March 31, 1999, hearing, the district court granted Stringam's summary 
judgment motion against John Stovall, ordered Myers to calculate the amount of the 
balloon payment, and took all other summary judgment motions under consideration. 
(Rec. at 737). 
40. In an April 8, 1999, letter to the district court Myers stated the amount of 
the balloon payment at $135,239.83. (Rec. at 752). 
41. In an April 12, 1999, Memorandum Decision, the court granted Stringam's 
Motion to Set Aside Default, and denied all other summary judgment motions. (Rec. at 
749). 
42. On April 23, 1999, Stringam filed a Notice of Intent to Use Prior Criminal 
Convictions for Impeachment Purposes. (Rec. at 757). 
43. On April 30, 1999, trial was held for a full day, to be concluded in June. 
(Rec. at 1047). 
44. On June 10, 14 & 23, 1999, Myers filed Motions to Strike and Vacate the 
Ruling of October 28, 1997. (Rec. at 767, 771 & 774 respectively). On July 8, 1999, 
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Stringam filed her Response to Myers' Motion to Strike. (Rec. at 814). 
45. On June 28, 1999, the trial resumed and was completed, except that the 
district court allowed the parties to submit written closing arguments. (Rec. at 816 & 
1048). 
46. On July 2, 1999, Erin Stovall's counsel submitted Closing Arguments. 
(Rec at 901). On August 4, 1999, Stringam filed her response to Erin Stovall's Closing 
Arguments. (Rec. at 914). 
47. On July 15, 1999, without submitting closing arguments, Myers filed 
several Post-trial Motions, arguing: (1) that Stringam's complaint should be dismissed 
because she had showed no right to relief; (2) that the testimony of the expert accountant 
should be stricken because the parties' intent was the best evidence; (3) that Stringam was 
in default for failure to make the balloon payment; (4) that the court should strike the 
evidence of Myers' convictions; and (5) that Myers' Petition for Writ of Certiorari be 
released to him. (Rec. at 868 & 872). 
48. On July 29, 1999, Stringam filed her Opposition to Myers' Post-trial 
Motions. (Rec. at 906). 
49. On July 19, 1999, Stringam submitted her Closing Arguments, and filed a 
Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. (Not included in the district court record) 
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50. On August 23, 1999, Stringam's counsel submitted a Request for Ruling on 
all issues, including Stringam's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. (Rec. at 920). 
51. In an August 31, 1999, Ruling, the district court denied Myers' Post-trial 
Motions, with the exception that the court granted Myers request that his Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari be released to him. (Rec. at 925). On October 29, 1999, the Ruling was 
entered as an Order. (Rec. at 955). 
52. The court also denied Myers' Motion to Vacate the October 28, 1997, 
Order on September 8, 1999. (Rec. at 925 & 955). 
53. On September 30, 1999, Myers filed a Notice of Appeal. (Rec. at 939). On 
November 10, 1999, Myers filed an Amended Notice of Appeal. (Rec. at 956). On 
December 14, 1999, the Utah Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over Myers' 
appeal. (Rec. at 980 & 979). 
54. On December 16, 1999, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision 
regarding the issues argued at trial. (Rec. at 977). On January 31, 2000, the district court 
issued the Final Order and Judgment in which it memorialized its findings and 
conclusions. (Rec. at 1018). 
55. On January 13 , 2000, the parties participated in a telephone conference at 
which arguments regarding amendments to the Final Order and Judgment were made. 
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(Rec. at 991). 
56. On January 14, 2000, the district court issued an Addendum to 
Memorandum Decision (Rec. at 993), which was memorialized on February 4, 2000, 
when the district court issued the Addendum to Final Judgment and Order. (Rec. at 
1026). 
57. On February 29, 2000, Myers filed a Notice of Appeal in which he listed 
the Final Order and Judgment and the Addendum to Final Judgment and Order as the 
orders he was appealing from. (Rec. at 1027). 
58. Stringam filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on March 8, 2000. (Rec. at 1034). 
59. On March 22, 2000, Myers filed his Docketing Statement, and on or about 
March 27, 2000, Stringam filed her Cross-Docketing Statement. 
60. On April 2, 2000, Stringam filed her Motion for Summary Disposition of 
All Issues. 
61. On or about April 18, 2000, this case was assigned to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. (Rec. at 1041). 
62. On or about April 17, 2000, Myers filed his Motion to Dismiss Appellee's 
Cross-Appeal. 
63. On or about April 24, 2000, Myers filed his Motion to Withdraw 
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Addendum to Final Judgment and Order, Date February 4, 2000, from Pending Appeal 
Proceedings. 
64. On or about April 27, 2000, Stringam filed her Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition to Myers' Motion to Dismiss. 
65. On or about May 2, 2000, Myers filed his Reply to Stringam5 s 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Myers9 Motion to Dismiss. 
66. On May 5, 2000, Stringam filed her Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Response to Myers' Motion to Withdraw Addendum. 
67. Also in May 2000 the Court issued a Motion to Dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
68. On May 23, 2000, Stringam filed her Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Appellate Jurisdiction over Stringam's Cross-Appeal. 
69. On or about May 25, 2000, Myers filed his Response to Stringam's Motion 
for Summary Disposition of all Issues. 
70. On or about June 7, 2000, Stringam filed her Motion to Dismiss Myers' 
Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction. 
71. Also on or about June 7, 2000, Stringam filed her Reply to Myers' 
Response to Stringam's Motion for Summary Disposition of All Issues. 
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72. On June 14, 2000, the Court issued its Order Denying and Deferring 
Motions for Summary Disposition. 
73. Myers filed his Appellate Brief on or about July 25, 2000. 
74. On or about August 1, 2000, Myers filed a Citation of Supplemental 
Authority. 
C. TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION 
The district court found that the Agreement was ambiguous, that Stringam was 
entitled to purchase the Home, and that the balloon payment was $141,547.21. The court 
ordered that Stringam place $141,547.21 in an escrow account, and that a title company 
of Stringam's choosing distribute the funds to the underlying mortgage holder first, then 
to Erin Stovall, and then Myers' portion was to be distributed to Stringam for payment of 
her attorney fees. In addition, upon the filing of an affidavit by the title company stating 
that the funds had been disbursed pursuant to the order, title in the Home was to be 
quieted to Stringam. 
VIIL RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On October 8, 1990, Wade and Jeannie Stringam entered into a real estate 
lease/purchase agreement ("Agreement") with Erin Stovall (then married to Patrick 
Stovall) in regards to a home located at 98 West 500 North, American Fork, Utah 
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("Home"). (Rec. at 820, Exhibit No. 1, located in manilla envelope marked "Exhibits'. 
See also Addendum). 
2. Although Morris Myers ("Myers") was not an original party to the 
Agreement, he drafted the Agreement for the parties (Rec. at 484, Admission 1), acting as 
a pseudo-attorney for Erin Stovall. 
3. The Agreement provided that Wade and Jeannie Stringam would pay 
$800.00 of the $1,038.00 monthly mortgage payments on the Home's underlying trust 
deed note until August 1, 1997, when the balance of the purchase price came due in one 
balloon payment. (Rec. at 820, Exhibit No. 1, located in manilla envelope marked 
"Exhibits'. See also Addendum). 
4. The Agreement further provided that if Wade and Jeannie Stringam were 
unable to pay the $800.00 then they had the option to sell the Home prior to the August 1, 
1997, deadline and divide the proceeds in excess of $109,000 with Erin Stovall. (Id). 
5. Finally, the Agreement allowed Wade and Jeannie Stringam to pay the 
balloon payment and purchase the Home. (Id.). 
6. Sometime after 1990 Erin Stovall conveyed part of her interest in the Home 
to John Patrick Stovall in a divorce settlement, but reserved one-half of the interest in the 
potential proceeds from the sale of the Home if they exceeded $109,000. (Rec. at 901, 
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Exhibit A, ffif 10 -11; and Rec. at 820, Exhibits 54 & 59, located in manilla envelope 
marked "Exhibit"). 
7. In addition, subsequent to the Agreement Wade Stringam passed away, 
leaving his interest in the Home and his obligations under the Agreement to Jeannie 
Stringam ("Stringam"). 
8. Stringam made the $800.00 per month payments from the inception of the 
Agreement until the district court ordered her to make the full payment of $1,038.00. 
(Rec. at 1018, 1014 If 13; and Rec. at 161 & 165). 
9. On August 9, 1994, John Stovall transferred his interest in the Home to 
Myers. (Rec. at 820, Exhibit 6, located in manilla envelope marked "Exhibits"). 
10. In October 22, 1996, Stringam's counsel mailed a letter to Myers 
respectfully requesting that Myers allow Stringam to purchase the Home. (Rec. at 820, 
Exhibit 11, located in manilla envelope marked "Exhibits"). 
11. Myers refused to allow Stringam to purchase the Home. (Rec. at 820, 
Exhibit 13, located in manilla envelope marked "Exhibits"). 
12. Stringam's subsequent attempts to negotiate with Myers and her several 
offers to pay the balloon payment based on her calculations proved futile. (Rec. at 1018, 
1002). 
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13. Because Myers refused to cooperate, Stringam worried Myers would 
continue to thwart her efforts to purchase the home before the August 1, 1997, deadline. 
14. On February 3, 1997, Stringam filed a Complaint against Myers. (Rec. at 
9). 
15. Myers countered, claiming that the Agreement was a joint venture and that 
the Agreement prohibited a sale of the Home to Stringam. (Rec. at 16). 
16. Subsequent to the balloon payment due date, Myers voluntarily abandoned 
his claim that the Agreement was a joint venture (Rec. at 1046, Page 31, Lines 2 through 
15), and concentrated on his averment that Stringam had breached the Agreement by 
failing to pay the balloon payment and by refusing to vacate the Home. 
17. On August 18, 1997, Stringam filed a Tender Offer and Motion to Allow 
Substitute Performance, in which Stringam tendered $104,201.75, the amount that she 
calculated to be due per the Agreement, to Myers as payment in full of the balloon 
payment. (Rec. at 87). 
18. The purpose of Stringam's tender offer and motion was to prevent Myers 
from claiming that Stringam had defaulted on the Agreement. (Rec. at 87, 86). 
19. Myers rejected Stringam's $104,201.75 tender offer. (Rec. at 93). 
20. Over Myers' objection, the district court allowed Stringam to tender the 
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balloon payment to the court, but increased the amount to $109,000 with the 
understanding that the actual amount of the balloon payment would have to be 
determined at trial. (Rec. at 1018, % 9; Rec. at 125; and Rec. at 158). 
21. In an August 14, 1997, letter, Myers notified Stringam that she was in 
default for failing to pay the balloon payment, that the balloon payment amount was 
$134,618.47, and that Stringam had 30 days to cure the default. (Rec. at 820, Exhibit 
23, located in manilla envelope marked "Exhibits"). 
22. Subsequent to her tender of $104,201.75, Stringam moved the district court 
to require Myers to tender to the court good title to the Home. (Rec. at 116). 
23. Myers could not do so. 
24. In December 1998, pursuant to Utah R. Civ P. 68, Stringam filed an Offer 
of Judgment of $150,000 as settlement in full of the dispute. (Rec. at 570). 
25. Myers again refused to accept the settlement offer. 
26. On April 8, 1999, Myers sent a letter to the district court in which he stated 
that he had miscalculated the balloon payment, and that the actual amount was 
$135,239.83. (Rec. at 820, Exhibit 42, located in manilla envelope marked "Exhibits"). 
27. Trial was held on April 30, 1999, and June 28, 1999. (Rec. at 761 & 1047; 
and Rec. at 816 & 1048). 
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28. The trial court found that Stringam properly tendered her offer to Myers as 
of July 31, 1997, one day before the deadline. (Rec. at 110 & 125). 
29. The district court also found the Agreement to be uncertain and ambiguous. 
(Rec. at 1018). 
30. At trial, expert testimony was presented to explain the number of different 
sums for the balloon payment that could be derived from the terms of the Agreement. 
(Rec. at 1047, Pages 100 through 128). 
31. The expert calculated and submitted three different possible balloon 
payment amounts as of April 1999; $102,193.08, $143,910.78, and $109,000. (Rec. at 
820, Exhibits 51, 52 & 53 respectively, located in manilla envelope marked "Exhibits"). 
32. The expert also submitted analysis of the Agreement's payment split (Rec. 
at 820, Exhibit 48, located in manilla envelope marked "Exhibits") and profit split (Rec. 
at 820, Exhibit 48, located in manilla envelope marked "Exhibits"), and a comparison of 
the amortization schedules (Rec. at 820, Exhibit 50, located in manilla envelope marked 
"Exhibits"). 
33. Furthermore, the trial court found that: 
Stringam attempted numerous times to ascertain the amount required for the 
balloon payment. Ms. Stringam went further and made offers to Defendant 
Myers for the balloon payment. Myers continually avoided the Plaintiff and 
refused to let her perform her obligation under the agreement...Myers cannot 
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frustrate an attempt by Stringam to perform. 
(Rec. at 1018, 1002). 
34. Additionally, at trial Stringam offered evidence of Myers' convictions for 
embezzlement and conveying property to defraud creditors. (Rec. at 820, Exhibits 43 & 
44, located in manilla envelope marked "Exhibits"). 
35. Stringam filed a Notice of Intent to Use Prior Criminal Convictions for 
Impeachment Purposes prior to trial, to which Myers did not respond or oppose. (Rec. at 
757). 
36. The district court concluded that, due to the negative amortization of the 
interest to the Agreement, the balloon payment was $134,043.24 as of August 1, 1997, 
and that Stringam's payoff as of January 1, 2000 was $141,547.21. (Rec. at 1018, 
1000). 
37. The Court found that the prevailing party in the litigation was Stringam and 
that under the terms of Paragraph Six of the Agreement, Stringam had a right to attorney 
fees. (Rec. at 1018, 999). 
38. The district court declined to bind Myers to Stringam's original tender of 
$104,211.75. (Rec. at 993-2). 
39. All of the parties except Myers submitted closing arguments. 
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40. On July 14, 1999, Myers submitted his Post-Trial Motions in which he 
argued that: (a) the expert should not have been allowed to testify because the Agreement 
was not ambiguous; (b) the balloon payment was late and Stringam forfeited her rights to 
the Home; (c) evidence of his convictions were improperly admitted; and (d) his 
substantive due process rights were violated because he was prevented from taking 
possession of the Home. (Rec. at 868 & 872). 
41. Based on the district court's award of attorney fees to Stringam, her counsel 
submitted an application and affidavit of attorney fees requesting $73,574.90. (Rec. at 
938). 
42. Initially the district court only awarded $12,000.00 to Stringam for the 
attorney fees she incurred. (Rec. at 1018, 999). 
43. However, after a subsequent telephone conference in chambers (Rec. at 991 
& 993), the Court awarded to Stringam attorney fees from December 21, 1998 
(approximately $42,531.41), the date that Stringam extended to Myers her $150,000.00 
offer of judgment. (Rec. at 1026). 
44. The district court's ruling on attorney fees reduced Stringam's award of 
attorney fees by $31,043.49. (Rec. at 1026, 1024). 
45. The district court never made a ruling regarding whether Stringam's 
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$73,574.90 in attorney fees was unreasonable. 
46. Throughout the proceedings, Myers constantly argued that Stringam failed 
to make the balloon payment and was therefore in default. 
47. When Myers filed his Notice of Appeal, there was no Certificate of Mailing 
accompanying the Notice. (Rec. at 1027). 
a. Myers' modus operandi is to insert his certificate of service directly 
under the signature line on documents filed with the Court. See 
Myers' Docketing Statement; Motion to Dismiss Appellee's Cross-
Appeal; Motion to Withdraw Addendum to Final Judgment and 
Order Dated February 4, 2000, From Pending Appeal Proceedings; 
Reply to Stringam's Memo of Points and Authorities in Opposition 
to Appellant's Motion to Dismiss; and Appellate Brief). Every 
pleading that Myers has filed with the Court and served on 
Stringam's counsel to date in this appeal, with the exception of the 
Notice of Appeal, has had the certificate of service on the same page 
of, and directly under the signature line. 
b. Additionally, there are three work days between February 29, 2000, 
the day Myers filed his Notice, and March 3, 2000, the day that 
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Stringam's counsel received Myers' Notice. 
IX, SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court should reverse the district court's conclusion that Myers is not bound 
by Stringam's initial $104,211.74 tender of the balloon payment pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-
27-4 because Myers failed to provide an alternate amount of the balloon payment. In 
addition, the Court should reverse the district court's arbitrary reduction of Stringam's 
attorney fee auard because: (1) the district court reduced the fees without making a 
finding of unreasonableness; and (2) because the district court based its reduction on the 
mistaken belief that it could limit the award to fees incurred after Myers rejected 
Stringam's offer of judgment. Furthermore, the Court should strike Myers' Citation of 
Supplemental Authority, filed on or about August 1, 2000, because it violates Utah Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 24(i). Finally, the Court should either decline to consider the 
issues raised by Myers in his Appellate Brief because his brief does not comply with the 
content and formatting requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure or the 
Court should dismiss Myers' appeal for lack of jurisdiction because his service of his 
Notice of Appeal on Stringam was defective. 
If the Court decides to consider the merits of Myers' appeal, Stringam respectfully 
requests that the Court order as follows: (1) that the district court's denial of Myers' Post-
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Trial Motions was within the discretion of the district court; (2) that the district court 
correctly concluded that the Agreement was ambiguous and did not err in its admission of 
extrinsic evidence to interpret the Agreement; (3) that the Addendum to Final Judgment 
and Order was a final judgment despite the fact that the district court did not award a 
sum-certain attorney fee award to Stringam; (4) that Stringam may appeal from the Final 
Order and Judgment and Addendum to Final Judgment and Order even though she was 
found to be the prevailing party at the district court level; and (5) that the district court 
correctly allowed Stringam to tender the approximated balloon payment to the court and 
correctly found that Stringam did not default on the Agreement by not paying the balloon 
payment to Myers on the August 1, 1997, deadline. 
X, ARGUMENT 
A. STRINGAM'S ISSUES ON APPEAL 
/. The Court Should Reverse the District Court and Hold That Myers Is Bound 
by Stringam's $104,000 Tender. 
Myers should be bound to the amount of Stringam's original tender of 
$104,211.74 because Myers failed to provide an alternate balloon payment amount. The 
trial court erred when it altered the amount of the balloon payment due under the 
Agreement, changing it from $104,211.74 to $141,547.21. (Rec. at 1018, 1000). The 
Court should review the district court's interpretation and application of U.C.A. § 78-27-
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3 for correctness, without deference to the district court's conclusions. State v. Redd, 
1999 UT 108 1f 10, 385 Utah Adv. Rep. 23. 
Section 78-27-3 of the Utah Code states: 
The person to whom a tender is made must, at the time, 
specify any objection he may have to the money, instrument 
or property, or he is deemed to have waived it; and, if the 
objection is to the amount of money, the terms of the 
instrument or the amount or kind of property, he must specify 
the amounts, terms or kind which he requires, or be 
precluded from objection afterwards. 
U.C.A. § 78-27-3 (emphasis added). See also First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Maxwell 
659 P.2d 1078, 1081-82 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted). Thus, a person to whom a 
tender is made must, at the time, specify the objections to it, or the objections are waived. 
I(L 
Here the district court incorrectly applied U.C.A. § 78-27-3 because Myers should 
be bound to Stringam's first offer. Stringam attempted numerous times to try to ascertain 
from Myers the amount of the balloon payment. She even made a $150,000 offer of 
judgment to Myers. (Rec. at 570). Myers continually avoided Stringam and refused to 
let her perform her obligations under the Agreement. (Rec. at 1018, 1002). Stringam 
finally resorted to filing a complaint and later an offer to tender the balloon payment to 
the court pending the outcome of the case; both pleadings were filed before the August 1, 
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1997, balloon payment deadline. (Rec. at 9 & 87). 
Stringam's original tender amount was $104,211.74. (Rec. at 87). An accountant 
calculated this amount for Stiingam. The court increased the amount to $109,000, and 
then allowed Stiingam to tender the amount to the court. (Rec. at 125 & 158). Myers did 
not then, nor for some time thereafter provide an alternate amount. Instead Myers 
continually alleged that the Agreement spoke for itself. When Myers attempted to 
provide a balloon payment amount he was unable to come up with one amount and 
submitted several different amounts. (Rec. at 820, Exhibits 23 & 42, located in manilla 
envelope marked "Exhibits"). Even though Myers failed to provide an alternate balloon 
payment amount as required by U.C.A. § 78-27-3, the district court, in its Final Order 
and Judgment, ordered that Stiingam pay a balloon payment of $141,547.21. (Rec. at 
1018, 999). The district court, therefore, incorrectly applied the statute, and the Court 
should reverse the district court and hold that Myers is bound by Stringam's $104,211.74 
tender. 
There are also policy reasons for reversing the district court on this matter. First, 
the statute was created to address this exact situation; the statute prevents one party to a 
contract from drawing out the completion of the contract by refusing to accept or counter 
a tender. The statute should be allowed to fulfill its purpose. Second, the district court 
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would not bind Myers to Stringam's first tender because Stringam did tender the correct 
amount initially. This was unfair - it took an entire trial to determine the amount of the 
balloon payment. Stringam should not be penalized by having to pay more for the Home 
simply because Myers refused to provide an alternate balloon payment amount. 
2. The Court Should Reverse the District CourVs Arbitrary Reduction of 
Stringam's Attorney Fee Award. 
The Court should reverse the district court's arbitrary reduction of Stringam's 
attorney fees award because the district court reduced the fees without making a finding 
of unreasonableness. While, the award of attorney fees to Stringam was proper, the 
district court's reduction of the amount of the award was improper. The standard of 
review here is abuse of discretion; however, the award must be supported by the 
evidence. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 
1988). 
The reduction in Stringam's attorney fees award here is not supported by the 
evidence. In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, the Utah State Supreme Court stated: 
LT]he trial court has broad discretion in determining what 
constitutes a reasonable fee, and we will consider that 
determination against an abuse-of-discretion standard. 
However, once the trial court makes that determination in 
the exercise of its sound discretion, it commits legal error if 
it awards less than the reasonable fee to which the 
successful litigant is entitled 
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Dixie State Bank v. Bracken 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added). Here the 
court found that Stringam was the prevailing party in the litigation and that Stringam was 
entitled to attorney fees. (Rec. at 1018, 999). Stringam's counsel subsequently filed an 
affidavit requesting $73,574.90 in fees and costs; which is the amount that Stringam had 
incurred over the four-year dispute. (Rec. at 938). In the Final Order and Judgment the 
district court awarded $12,000.00 in attorney fees to Stringam. (Rec. at 1018, 999). 
After protest by Stringam, the court held a subsequent hearing at which it awarded 
Stringam her fees and costs incurred from December 21, 1998, which is the date that 
Stringam extended to Myers her $150,000.00 judgment offer. (Rec. at 991 & 1026, 
1024). There was no finding of unreasonableness for either award, and the second award 
of approximately $42,531.41 was considerably less than the fees that Stringam should 
have received. 
Furthermore, the date restriction imposed by the district court was also an arbitrary 
limitation of Stringam's attorney fee award and was based on the misunderstanding that 
an offer of judgment could be used as a basis from which to award attorney fees. (Rec. a 
1026). For instance, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 68, governing an award of costs where 
a party rejects a judgment offer and subsequently receives less than the offer in the 
proceedings, does not support the district court's reduction of Stringam's attorney fees. 
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See Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 1270 (Utah App. 1994) (refusing to award attorney fees 
pursuant to Rule 68(b) because Rule 68(b) applies only to costs). The date of Stringam's 
offer of judgment should not be used as a basis for denying attorney fees. 
Thus, without making a finding of unreasonableness, the district court arbitrarily 
reduced the award of attorney fees that Stringam was entitled to. Stringam was, 
therefore, required to pay more than $30,000 in attorney fees that should have been paid 
by Myers pursuant to the Agreement. The trial court committed legal error when it 
arbitrarily reduced the fee without a finding of unreasonableness. The Court should, 
therefore, increase the attorney fees award to $73,574.90. 
B. ISSUES THAT HAVE ARISEN 
IN THE COURSE OF THIS APPEAL 
1. The Court Should Dismiss Myers Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction Because 
Myers9 Service of His Notice on Stringam Was Faulty. 
The Court should dismiss Myers' appeal because Myers' service of his Notice of 
Appeal on Stringam was defective; Myers filed his Notice of Appeal with the Court on 
February 29, 2000, and subsequently waited a few days to mail the Notice to Stringam. 
(Rec. at 1027). In addition, Myers did not include a certificate of service with his notice 
of appeal. (Rec. at 1027). The Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction over Myer's appeal. 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3, which sets out the procedures to be followed 
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for an appeal as of right, states that "[t]he party taking the appeal shall give notice of the 
filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of 
record of each party to the judgment or order " Utah R. App. P. 3(e) (emphasis 
added). Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 21 further enumerates the steps that an 
appellant must take to serve opposing parties, stating: 
Copies of all papers filed with the appellate court shall, at or before the time 
of filing, be served on all other parties to the appeal or review. Service on a 
party represented by counsel shall be made on counsel of record, A copy 
of any paper required by these rules to be served on a party shall be filed with 
the court and accompanied by a proof of service. 
Utah R. App. P. 21(b) (emphasis added). 
Here, based on the above rules, service of Myers' Notice of Appeal was not 
proper. Myers did not mail his Notice of Appeal to Stringam on or before the day that he 
filed it. Instead, Myers signed his Notice on February 28, 2000, filed the Notice on 
February 29, 2000, and mailed the Notice on March 1st or 2nd. Without a certificate of 
service it is impossible to know exactly when Myers mailed the Notice, but Stringam's 
counsel received the Notice on Friday, March 3, 2000. It is unlikely that the Notice took 
two or three days to go from Midvale to Pleasant Grove. 
In addition, Myers failed to include a certificate of service to verify when he 
actually mailed the Notice. Whether out of intent to prejudice Stringam or through 
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inadvertence, Myers' ^violation of the procedural rules deprives this Court of jurisdiction. 
See Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency. 977 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1999) (stating that 
appellant's failure to specify a specific summary judgment in his notice of appeal 
deprived the appellate court of jurisdiction over issues arising from that summary 
judgment because appellee was prejudiced by not receiving notice and because "rule 
3(d)'s requirement is jurisdictional."). See also Yost v. State. 640 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Utah 
1981) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over a party who participated in the 
district court action but was not given notice of the appeal). 
2. Myers9 Citation of Supplemental Authority Is Improper and Should Be 
Stricken. 
Myers' August 1, 2000, Citation of Supplemental Authority regarding joint 
venture law is improperly before the Court, and should be stricken. Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 24(i) states in relevant part that: 
[w]hen pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a 
party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral arguments but 
before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate 
court, by letter setting forth the citations. . . . [B]ut the letter shall without 
argument state the reasons for the supplemental citations. 
Utah R. App. P. 24(i) (emphasis added). 
There is nothing pertinent or significant in the authorities that Myers cites in his 
Citation of Supplemental Authority. In fact, Myers is now directly addressing the "joint 
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venture" issue for the first time since the conclusion of the district court proceedings. 
This is an issue that he abandoned at the district court level. (See Rec. at 1046, Page 31, 
Lines 2 through 15). Myers' failure to raise this issue before now is prejudicial to 
Stringam's interest, and violates her due process rights. See e.g. Jensen v. Intermountain. 
977 P.2d 474 (Utah 1999). Furthermore, the quotes from B.A. Mortgage & International 
Realty v. American National Bank. 706 F. Supp. 1364 (N.D. 111. 1989), are not 
supplemental to any arguments presented by Myers in his Appellate Brief. It appears 
inherent in Rule 24(i) that a citation to supplemental authority must in some way 
supplement the appellate brief. See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 24(i). 
Additionally, Myers raises an argument in his Citation of Supplemental Authority, 
which Rule 24(i) prohibits. On the second page of the Myers' Citation of Supplemental 
Authority Myers cites to the Agreement, and applies the quotes from B.A. Mortgage to 
the Agreement. This application of law to the facts is an improper argument. The Court 
should strike Myers9 Citation of Supplemental Authority and refuse to consider the issues 
raised therein. 
3. The Court Should Decline to Address Myers's Issues. 
The Court should decline to address the issues raised in Myers' Appellate Brief 
because his brief does not comply with the content and formatting requirements of the 
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Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. He does not provide a complete statement of the 
proceedings or of the facts, does not provide cogent statements of the issues and 
standards of reviews, nor does he provide any sound arguments. Instead, Myers 
haphazardly cites cases and statutes that provide only general statements of law. The 
Court may decline to consider the Myers' arguments because of Myers' noncompliance. 
See MacKav v. Hardy. 973 P.2d 941, 949 (Utah 1998) (declining to address issues not 
presented in compliance with Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24); and State v. 
Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, 989 P.2d 503, 510 ("Defendant's brief fails to cite relevant 
legal authority or provide any meaningful analysis . . . . 'This court has routinely 
declined to consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal' (citation 
omitted). Because the briefing on this issue is inadequate, we decline to consider the 
merits."). See also State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1992). 
C. STRINGAM'S RESPONSE TO THE ISSUES RAISED 
IN MYERS' APPELLATE BRIEF. 
1. The District Court Properly Denied Myers' Post-trial Motions. 
The Court should not consider this issue because it is not properly before the 
Court; Myers is now raising this issue for the first time since the conclusion of the district 
court proceedings. See Knight v. Ebert (Matter of Estate of Justheiml 824 P.2d 432, 
436-37, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Utah App. 1991) (declining to address an issue raised by 
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the appellant in an amended appellate brief where the issue was not raised in the 
appellant's docketing statement or primary appellate brief). See also Jensen v. 
Intermountain, 1999 UT 10 ffif 5-9, 977 P.2d 474 (declining to address an issue not raised 
by the appellant in his notice of appeal). Furthermore, the Court should not allow 
Stringam's interests to be prejudiced by allowing Myers' to raise issues whenever he 
pleases despite failure to raise the issue in his Notice of Appeal. See Jensen v. 
Intermountain. 977 P.2d 474 (Utah 1999). 
Myers' Notice of Appeal states that he is appealing from the Final Judgment and 
Order and the Addendum to Final Order and Judgment. The denial of Myers' Post-trial 
motions occurred on September 8, 1999, is not listed in his Notice of Appeal, and is not 
part of the Final Order and Judgment or Addendum to Final Judgment and Order. 
However, if the Court decides to consider this issue, the standard of review should be 
abuse of discretion. See Van Per Stappen v. Van Per Stappen. 815 P.2d 1335, 1336, 166 
Utah Adv. Rep. 58 (Utah App. 1991). See also Roundv v. Stalev. 984 P.2d 404, 406, 
374 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah App. 1999). 
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Myers' Post-Trial 
Motions. The court provided sufficient legal and factual bases for its conclusions. 
Myers' Post-trial Motions requested, among other things: (1) that Stringam's complaint 
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be dismissed because,she failed to show her right to relief; (2) that the expert's testimony 
be stricken because it violated the best evidence rule; (3) that the court find Stringam to 
be in default of the Agreement; and (4) that the evidence of Myers' convictions be 
stricken because they were not indicative of moral turpitude. (Rec. at 868 & 872). In its 
September 2, 1999, ruling, the district court denied Myers' Post-Trial Motions. (Rec. at 
925). In that ruling the district court found as follows: (1) Stringam proved her right to 
relief because she showed that her tender of the balloon payment to the court was proper 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-27-1 as a substitute for payment to Myers and because she 
showed that the parties were bound by the Agreement; (2) the admission of the 
accountant's expert testimony was proper because it was used to assist the trier-of-fact 
and because the testimony was not used to prove the contents of the Agreement; (3) 
Stringam's tender of the balloon payment to the court was proper and, therefore, Stringam 
did not default on the Agreement; and (4) that the admission of Myers' convictions was 
proper because "embezzlement is a felony involving honesty, which illustrates moral 
turpitude," and because Myers did not object when Stringam gave notice of her intent to 
use his convictions for impeachment purposes. (Rec. at 925 through 929). 
The district court was well within its discretion in denying Myers' Post-Trial 
Motions, and the court should affirm the district court in this matter. 
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2. The District Court Correctly Determined That the Agreement Is Ambiguous 
And, Therefore, Properly Admitted Extrinsic Evidence to Interpret the Agreement 
The district court properly found that the Agreement is ambiguous. The standard 
of review that the Court should apply to the district court's finding of ambiguity is 
correctness. Sprouse v. Jager. 806 P.2d 219, 222, 153 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah App. 
1991). 
The Agreement is ambiguous. An ambiguity exists where the language "is 
reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense." Dixon v. Pro Image, 
Inc.. 987 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah 1999) (citations omitted). Prior to and during the district 
court proceedings in the trial court, the nature of the Agreement was at issue. While 
Stringam consistently asserted that the Agreement was a lease containing an option to 
buy, Myers at first asserted that the agreement was a joint venture (Rec. at 16), but later 
abandoned his joint venture argument and agreed that the Agreement was a 
lease/purchase agreement. (Rec. at 1046, Page 31, Lines 2-15). The trial court 
appropriately looked first to the plain language of the Agreement. The Agreement 
contains my ambiguities, including the following statements. The first line of the 
Agreement contains the words "Joint Venture Agreement" in capital letters. (Rec. at 
820, Exhibit 1, located in manilla envelope marked "Exhibits"). The second paragraph of 
the Agreement again calls the Agreement a joint venture. (Id.). However, the fourth 
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paragraph of the Agreement states in pertinent part that "this joint venture contemplates 
the purchase by First Party [Stringam] from Second Party [Erin Stovall] of said property 
for $109,000 . . . . " (Id.). Again, on the second page, paragraph number 1, the 
Agreement states that "Second party [Erin Stovall] agrees to sell and First Party 
[Stringam] agrees to buy said real property." (Id.). Finally, on page four, paragraph 
number 11, the Agreement describes the distribution of the proceeds in excess of 
$109,000 if the Home is sold. (Id.). The Court stated in its December 16, 1999, 
Memorandum Decision, regarding the language on page two, paragraph number 1, that 
"[t]his language taken on its face seems to indicate a lease/option to buy." (Rec. at 977). 
After looking to the four corners of the Agreement and determining that the 
Agreement is ambiguous, the district court properly looked to the parties' intent. The 
standard here should be clear error. Sprouse v. Jager. 806 P.2d 219, 221-22, 153 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted). 
Both Stringam and Erin Stovall, the only two original parties to the Agreement, 
testified that the Agreement was a lease/purchase agreement. "Only when an ambiguity 
exists which cannot be reconciled by an objective and reasonable interpretation of the 
[Agreement] as a whole" should the court resort to evidence beyond the four comers of 
the agreement. Anderson v. Gardner. 647 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah 1982). After reviewing the 
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extrinsic evidence, the court supported its analysis of the Agreement by stating that "[t]he 
language of the contract, and the intention and actions of the parties, establish that the 
agreement was a lease/option to buy." (Rec. at 1018, 1003). 
Because Myers drafted the Agreement, the Agreement's ambiguities should be 
construed against Myers' interests. Trolley Square Assoc, v. Nelson, 886 P.2d 61 (Utah 
App. 1994). Not only was there an ambiguity regarding the nature of the Agreement, but 
the amount of the balloon payment was also ambiguous. Myers' drafting of the 
Agreement created ambiguity as to whether the Agreement contemplated negative 
amortization-meaning that the principal of the loan grew instead of decreased; the 
Agreement makes it unclear whether interest payments begin with the first or second 
payment. Not only did the possibility of negative amortization in the lease make it nearly 
impossible for Stringam to determine the balloon payment amount, it also confused 
Myers and the district court. Myers himself produced different balloon payment 
amounts. (Rec. at 820, Exhibits 23 & 42, located in manilla envelope marked 
"Exhibits"). The trial court stated in its Final Order and Judgment, signed January 31, 
2000, that: 
The balloon payment amount has been the subject of much controversy. . . . 
The numbers quoted in documents submitted to the court, varied with at least 
four differing sums named. The Court has established that the sum is 
ambiguous and evidence and expert testimony regarding the calculation was 
STRINGAM APPELLATE BRIEF Page 42 of 50 
proper. The calculation or the balloon payment is further complicated by the 
nature of the agreement, that of a lease/option to buy with negative 
amortization. 
(Rec. at 1018, 1002). 
In Myers' Appellate Brief he haphazardly cites cases regarding contract 
ambiguities and contract interpretation without making cogent arguments. This approach 
is typical for Myers, and it is probably fair to assume that he is arguing that the 
Agreement was not ambiguous. Myers cites to several cases, providing a general 
statement of contract law from each but never providing analysis in the manner of 
applying those cases to the case at bar. Even if Myers were to provide analysis from the 
cases that he cites, they do not support his position4. For this and the previously stated 
4Myers cites the following cases in support of his contract ambiguity position: 
Copper State Leasing v. Blacker Appliance. 770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988) (holding that the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment was improper because the consideration was 
sufficient to sustain the parties' lease contract); Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262 (Utah App. 
1994) (interpreting a warranty deed for the purpose of asset distribution in a divorce 
proceeding); State ex rel. C.K.. 2000 UT App 11, 996 P.2d 1059 (regarding the 
termination of parental rights by the state); Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc., 804 P.2d 547 
(Utah App. 1991) (affirming the district court's refusal to admit parol evidence to 
interpret an integrated employment contract); Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital 638 P.2d 
1190 (Utah 1981) (affirming the district court's admission of parol evidence for the 
purpose of interpreting a performance contract where the contract was an "interim 
agreement"); Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991) (reversing and 
remanding a summary judgment for plaintiff where the summary judgment regarded the 
intent of the parties in the assignment of an executory land sale contract); Western Kane 
County Special Serv. Pis. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co.. 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987) (regarding 
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reasons, the Court should affirm the district court's conclusion that the Agreement was 
ambiguous. 
3. The Addendum to Final Judgment and Order Is a Final Order and 
Stringam's Appeal Therefrom Is Proper Even Though the District Court Did Not Enter 
a Sum-Certain Attorney Fees Award 
The Court should hold that the Addendum to the Final Judgment and Order is final 
and that Stringam's appeal from the Addendum is proper. The court should apply a 
correctness standard here to determine whether the Addendum to Final Judgment and 
Order is a final judgment. Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 1099, 1100 ( 
Utah 1991). 
The Addendum is a final judgment because the Addendum, in conjunction with 
the original Order, granted the relief that Stringam sought by determining the amount of 
the balloon payment and providing a method for Stringam to receive clear title to the 
Home. See Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(l)("every final judgment shall grant the relief to which 
the plaintiffs contention that roads crossing the defendant's land were public roads and, 
therefore, did not require acquisition by eminent domain); Maddux & Sons. Inc. v. 
Trustees of Ariz. Laborers. 610 P.2d 477 (Ariz. App. 1980) (affirming the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff/appellee in regards to a labor contract where 
the defendant/appellant was clearly bound by the contract); and Fugate v. Town of 
Pavson. 791 P.2d 1092 (Ariz. App. 1990) (affirming the district court's grant of summary 
judgment where it found that an easement was only a utility easement despite conflicting 
statements regarding the extent of the easement in the contract recitals and operative 
clauses). 
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the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled"). Additionally, the Addendum ended 
the controversy between the parties. See Salt Lake City Corp.. v. Layton. 600 P.2d 538, 
539 (Utah 1979) ("A judgment is final when it ends the controversy between the parties 
litigant."). As a final judgment, Stringam had the right to appeal the Addendum. See 
UtahR. App. P. 3. 
Here Myers alleges that because of the district court's failure to award a sum-
certain amount of attorney fees, the Addendum is not a final order. Myers relies on 
Promax Development Corp. v. Raile. 2000 UT 4, 998 P.2d 254, 386 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 
to support this argument. However, ProMax does not support Myers9 argument. In 
ProMax the issue was whether the order appealed from was final before the amount of 
attorney fees was determined. In its determination, this Court states: 
We therefore hold that, in the interest of judicial economy, a trial court must 
determine the amount of attorney fees awardable to a party before the 
judgment becomes final for the purposes of an appeal under Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 3. 
Promax, 2000 UT 4 f 15. The amount of fees is provided when a court provides a date 
from which to calculate those fees and is just as valid as when a court states a sum-
certain. The Court in ProMax never stated that a sum-certain amount must be provided. 
Myers has offered no reason to distinguish between the two situations, and it appears to 
be a distinction without a difference. 
Here, the trial court determined that attorney fees were awardable from December 
21, 1998. This finding gave Myers the opportunity to appeal the award and amount of 
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the attorney fees, thereby fulfilling the policy goal of the ProMax decision. See Promax. 
2000 UT 4 ^ [15 (citing the policy arguments in Meadowbrook LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 
115, 119 (Utah 1998)). 
In addition to ProMax, Myers cites several cases in support of his averment, on 
Page 5 of his Brief, that Stringam cannot appeal from the Addendum to Final Judgment 
and Order. However, Myers provides very little analysis, and (not surprisingly) the cases 
that Myers cites are either not applicable or simply provide general statements of law5. 
4. Stringam May Appeal from the Final Order and Judgment and from the 
Addendum to Final Judgment and Order Even Though Stringam Was Found to Be the 
Prevailing Party. 
The Court should not consider this issue, raised on Page 5 of Myers' Appellate 
Brief, because Myers is raising it for the first time in his Appellate Brief. See Knight v. 
Ebert (Matter of Estate of Justheim\ 824 P.2d 432, 436-37, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Utah 
App. 1991) (declining to address an issue raised by the appellant in an amended appellate 
brief where the issue was not raised in the appellant's docketing statement or primary 
appellate brief). See also Jensen v. Intermountain, 1999 UT 10 fflf 5-9, 977 P.2d 474 
(declining to address an issue not raised by the appellant in his notice of appeal). 
5See Home State Bank/National Ass'n v. Potokar. 617 N.E.2d 1302 (111. App. 
1993) (holding that an order granting attorney fees but failing to specify an amount was 
an interlocutory order); D'Aston v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 1992) (regarding the 
possession and ownership of property found in a divorce decree to belong to the husband 
where the property was in the possession of his son); Inland Group of Companies v. 
Obendorff. 959 P.2d 454 (Idaho 1998) (affirming the district court's refusal to award 
attorney fees to the special master for failure to pay part of the special master's fees 
because the special master was not a "party" to the dispute). 
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If the Court decides to consider this issue, it should conclude that Stringam's 
appeal is proper despite the fact that she was found to be the prevailing party below. 
Because this issue was not addressed in the district court, there is nothing for the Court to 
review. However, if the Court decides to consider the issue, it should hold that Stringam 
may appeal even though she was found to be the prevailing party below. 
In his brief, Myers cites two cases, each supporting the general statement that a 
party cannot appeal from a judgment in that party's favor. However, (not surprisingly) 
neither is applicable here. In Poage v. Co-Operative Pub. Co.. 66 P.2d 1119 (Idaho 
1937), an Idaho state statute governed who could appeal a judgment. Additionally, the 
parties in Poage who sought to appeal the judgment did not show how they were injured 
by the judgment. Similarly, in Commercial Block Realty Co. v. United Stated Fidelity 
and Guaranty Co.. the court stated that "[n]ot only must one be a party to a judgment 
before he can appeal, but the judgment must be adverse to his interests." Commercial 
Block Realty Co. v. United Stated Fidelity and Guaranty Co.. 28 P.2d 1081, 1082 (Utah 
1934). The cases cited by Myers do not support the proposition that the prevailing party 
cannot appeal, but instead show that a party cannot appeal a judgment it her favor; e.g. a 
defendant cannot appeal the dismissal of the complaint against her. See Commercial 
Block Realty Co. v. United Stated Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 28 P.2d 1081, 1082 (Utah 
1934). 
Here Stringam's counsel drafted the Final Judgment and Order and Addendum to 
Final Order and Judgment so that they conformed with the district court's findings and 
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conclusions. Furthermore, despite the fact that her attorney drafted the orders, Stringam's 
interests were adversely affected by the Final Order and Judgment and the Addendum to 
Final Judgment and Order because she was required to pay more that her tender of 
$104,211.74 for the balloon payment, and because she was required to pay more than 
$30,000 in attorney fees that Myers should have been required to pay. The Court should 
conclude that Stringam's appeal is proper. 
5. The District Court Properly Allowed Stringam to Tender the Balloon 
Payment to the Court During the Pendency of the Action. 
The Court should hold that the district court properly allowed Stringam to tender 
the balloon payment into the court pending the outcome of the dispute. The applicable 
statute here is U.C.A. § 78-27-4, and the standard of review is correctness. State v. Redd. 
1999 UT 108 1f 10, 992 P.2d 986, 385 Utah Adv. Rep. 23. 
The district court acted in accordance with the law when it granted Stringam's 
Tender Offer and Motion to Allow Substitute Performance, allowing Stringam to tender 
the balloon payment into the court instead of to Myers - particularly because Myers 
could not show that he had the ability to tender clear title to the Home. Furthermore, 
Stringam's tender to the court was proper pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-27-4. 
Here Myers alleges, as he continuously alleged in the district court, that Stringam 
did not tender the full amount to him by the deadline, that she materially breached the 
Agreement, and that he is entitled to relief. However, Stringam filed suit initially seeking 
a determination of the balloon payment amount, and seeking to compel Myers to allow 
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her to tender the balloon payment. (Rec. at 6). The trial court estimated the amount due 
at $109,000 and required Stringam to tender it to the court as performance until the actual 
amount due was determined. (Rec. It is asinine for Myers to continue to claim 
that the pay ment should have been tendered! In Inn i uhnt1 it luul .in intm; trial lo 
determine the amount that Stringam actually owed, and where the amount that Myers 
would actually receive was also at issue. 
Myers cites tl :;.,e ecu ICI u: i ei ice i n Commercial Investment Coi p. \ , Siggard, as 
supporting his arguments. See Commercial Investment Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105, 
314 Utah Adv. Rep. 41 (Utah App. 1997). However, Judge Orme's concurrence 
impliedly supports the steps taken by Stringam and rejects Myers' contention. See 
Commercial Investment Cor p. v Siggard, lHb P' ?"nl I! M) i, I I I \ I I  1 I hLiii 
(Utah App. 1997) (stating that because the buyer did not tender the interest payments to 
the seller or into the court the buyer had materially breached his contract and was not 
entitled to specific performance) 1 he l ouil should LOIH link th.il tin dislutt i, unit 
properly allowed Stringam to tender the balloon payment to the court. 
XL CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons Stringam respectfully requests that the Court order the 
foil' 
1. Reverse the district court's incorrect application of U.C.A. § 78-27-3 and 
require Myers to accept Stringam's original tender of $104, 21174; 
2. Reverse the district court's arbitrary reduction of attorney fees to Stringam 
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and remand for a determination of reasonableness by the district court; 
3. Strike Myers' Citation of Supplemental Authority. 
4. Dismiss Myers' appeal for lack of jurisdiction or Decline to consider 
Myers' arguments; 
5. Affirm the district court's denial of Myers' Post-trial Motions; 
6. Affirm the district court's conclusion that the Agreement is ambiguous and 
the district court's admission of extrinsic evidence to interpret the Agreement; 
7. Hold that the Addendum to Final Judgment and Order was a final judgment 
and that Stringam's appeal from the Addendum was proper; 
8. Hold that Stringam's appeal is proper even though Stringam was found to 
be the prevailing party; and 
9. Affirm the district court's decision to allow Stringam to tender the 
$109,000 balloon payment to the district court. 
Date: September 5 ^ , 2000 . 
DUVAL HANSEN^ITT & l^ORLEY, P.C. 
^ 
C. Val Morley ' 
"Trey" A.R. Dayes III 
Attorneys for Jeannie Stringam 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
JEANNIE STRING AM. 
Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
MORRIS MYERS, et al. 
Defendant/Appel' 
Appellee. 
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF < 
APPELLEE 
Case No. 20000179-CA 
This addendum contains the following documents: 
EXHIBi Final Judgment and Order; 
EXHIBIT B: Addendum I in I III >il < hdci .uicl ludgmeu; i 
EXHIBIT C: Real Estate Purchase Contract. 
EXHIBIT Di U.C. A § 78-27-3 
EXHIBIT F ' ("A fe 7H-2M. 
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EXHIBIT A 
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Fourth Judicial District Court 
ci v:^.u County. Stst* of Utah 
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"Trey" A.R. Dayes, III, Bar n. -4 
C. Val Morley, Bar No. 6942 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, V ( 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COl. JR1 
UTAH COUNT v <rr A T F OF T IT AH 
1 ?.5 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
STRINGAM, JEANNEE, ) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 




i hr, m.iflei rami: nn regularly for trial before the Court on May 20, 1999 and June 28, 1999. 
The Plaintiff appeared and was represented by counsel C. Val Morley, and u I re\ A K I lt\ i III. 
Defendant, Morris Myers representt icla > >i Iohn Patrick Stovail, Erin M. Stovall 
u us i rni esented by counsel Terry R. Spencer. The Court thereupon heard evidence by the parties 
and witnesses in support of their respective positions, reviewed the 111 t up* nf lL piu/ccdiiii" and 
exhibits, and ij|»t n l»n i ig ud v ls*»d \\\ Hi pivrn^e^ finds and concludes as follows: 
'4.M. ORDER - '-MENT 
i eNo. 9704000100 
idge Guy R. Burningham 
1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Complaint was filed cJn February 3,1997, by Plaintiff, Jeannie Stringam. On October 8,1990, 
Stringam entered into a real property lease/purchase agreement with Erin Stovall (then married to 
Patrick Stovall). In this agreement Stringam agreed to make $800.00 monthly payments until August 
1, 1997, when the balance of the trust deed note was to become due. If Stringam was ever unable 
to make the payments, she had the option to sell the property and divide the equity with Erin Stovall. 
Erin Stovall later transferred her interest in the property to John Patrick Stovall in a divorce 
settlement, reserving one-half interest in the proceeds above $109,000.00 from the sale of the home. 
John Stovall later transferred his interest to Morris Myers. Stringam continued to make the payments 
(which were $800.00 of a $1,3038.00 mortgage payment) until October 22, 1996, when Stringam's 
counsel mailed a letter to Myers offering to pay the outstanding balance of the trust deed note in full. 
Defendant, Myers claims he is not required to allow the Plaintiff to refinance the property and 
that he is entitled to one-half of the equity of the property upon completion of the terms of the 
agreement. This is in contradiction of the agreement, which contemplated such a division only if 
Stringam sold the property before the end of the term of the agreement. 
Stringam asked the Court for (1) Specific Performance, requiring Myers to accept the 
tender payment in full of the outstanding balance of the trust deed note, (2) Declaratory Judgment 
that Stringam may seek refinancing and pay the balance of the trust deed note without incurring any 
penalty, or dividing equity with Myers; (3) Quiet Title requiring Myers to cooperate in transferring 
2 
title to Stringam. 
2. Myers filed Answer on February 25, 199 i He denied every allegation in the Complaint and 
li'iti it llnoe f'lHimlnn LiiHii'i lie rlaims tin1 fellies enfncd inin i iniiif venture and that he was 
damaged in the amount of $100,000.00. He claims that the joint venture was formed for the purpose 
of selling the property to a third person and distributing the proceeds according to the tei i i is of tl ic 
agreements. He also claims that by refusing to sell the property to a third pejrson, Stringam is 
violating the fiduciary relationship that exists between the parities. 
3. Stringam filed Motion 10 Sinkc Ansvvci and (Vuiiilen Linn on \J,uili •' i(>)7. 
4. Myers, represented by Larry I,. Whyte, filed a Motion to Leave to Amend answer and 
Counterclaim on March 20, 1997. The parties later stipulated to allow Myers to file his Amended 
\ nsw em: a nd Coin ltei claii i i 
5. Stringam filed Answer and Counterclaim on April, 29, 1997. 
6. Stringam filed Motion to Allow Substitute Performance and Offer to Tender Balance into 
( ouil Mimyarn ask e«t in Hemlci % H M ,000 ni'i in ihc Cn\w\ sin c (he deadline foi I he pi'iymnil 
was approaching and counsel for Myers was not authorized to sign a stipulation for substitute 
performance Stringam was concerned that Myers would not honor the agreement and accept 
the fi n ids. hence the tender to the Court before the deadline of August 1, 1997. 
7. Myers filed Objection to Motion to Allow Substitute Performance on August 18, 1997 
Myers claimed the oi ln In Inula iiui utgut.1, imlmidv, mul nul lm llir lull aniniiiil iliiu ai id 
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owing, but did not indicate a balance he believed was owning. 
8. Stringam file Response to the Objection on September 24, 1997. Stringam's offer was 
timely and was made to keep Myers from claiming she had defaulted on the loan. Furthermore, 
under UCA§ 78-27-1, a written offer is deemed to be an actual production and tender of the 
payment if the defendant refuses to accept the offer. 
An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written 
instrument or specific personal property is, if not accepted, equivalent to the actual 
production and tender of the money, instrument or property. 
9. Oral arguments were held on October 1, 1997, before Judge Eyre, who found that 
Stringam had attempted to make a tender offer. She was ordered to tender $109,000.00 to the 
Court by October 7, 1997. Myers could petition the Court to withdraw the money to make the 
payments on the underlying trust deed. The Defendant would be responsible for the underlying 
trust deed payments. 
10. Stringam filed Motion for Expedited Declaratory Relief Requiring Defendant to Tender 
Title into Court on October 16, 1999. Stringam argued that she deposited the funds into Court, 
but Myers did not provide any indicia that he had clear title to the property. Stringam asked the 
Court to order title be transferred to Stringam and allow Myers to receive a trust deed in the 
property to protect his interest in any additional amounts the Court may determine Myers in 
entitled to receive. 
11. Myers filed Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Expedited Declaratory Relief on 
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October 31, 1997. Myers claimed the amount due to him is $134,000.00, not $109,000.00. 
Further it is argued tl rat Stringam did not tender this amount to the Court and is now in default. 
12. Stringam filed a reply to the Memo in Opposition for Expedited Declaratory Relief oi i 
November 6, 1997. Stringam paid $109,000.00 into the Court, which was addressed by the 
to provide Stringam with clear title. Furthermore, the amount of the balloon payment is one of 
the grounds of litigation The agreement was so unclear that it required judicial interpretatior i s 
In IIONN In niinpulo thi^  balana: tint- Mvn, ili.it'li \\ I In* IILMccniciit in quc^ion ||[ I'h* 
claimed that Stringam admitted $134,000.00 was the amount owed, Stringam's position is that 
she admitted she would be willing to tender this amount if he would give her clear title. He has 
13. The parties came before the Court on December 1, 1997. Stringam was allowed to 
withdraw her funds fi om the Coui is She was ordered to pay $32.84 per day in interest from 
August 1, 1997 through the day she nitfn1\in , fir monn S»"iw »m \\d a k i u t lnei h > (M , ll i 
full mortgage amount of $1,038.00. (Mr. Morley drafted the Order and changed the interest 
pa> i i iei: i! t< > $50.00.) •• 
14. Erin Stovall filed Motion to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order and 
Request for Fees on March 9, 1997. Erin moved for a protective order that her deposition not be 
has HID Ihc giounds list! shr is n irsidfril nl Villi I .ikt" .nidi lisis hcni s.iilifHK'iianil In apptMi mi I hi illi 
County. She claimed this is necessary to protect her from undue burden and expense. 
15. Stringam filed Motion to Amend Complaint on March 10, 1998. During the course of 
discovery Stringam learned that Erin and Patrick Stovall still have an interest in the property. 
Erin filed a Notion of Lis Pendens on October 22, 1997. 
16. Myers filed Motion for Summary Judgment on March 13, 1998. The Summary Judgment 
stated that Stingam had not paid the balloon payment, she had defaulted and therefore, summary 
judgment was appropriate for Myers. Myers claimed Stringam defaulted by not paying the funds 
on August 1, 1997. Myers then sent her a letter advising her she was in default and gave her 30 
days to tender payment. Myers then claimed that after several letters between counsel, Stringam 
filed the Motion to Allow Substitute Performance and Offer to Tender Balance. In actuality, 
Stringam filed the Motion to Allow Substitute Performance in July, several days before the 
August 1 deadline. Stringam filed this Motion because she was concerned that Myers would not 
accept the payments she was making. In addition, Stringam asked the Court to determine what 
the balloon payment should be because Myers either didn't tell her, or named an amount that 
seemed high and couldn't be reconciled with the agreement. 
17. Stringam filed Memo in Opposition to Erin Stovall's Motion to Quash Subpoena on 
March 16, 1998. Stringam claimed service was proper, and that since Erin conducted business in 
Utah County, her appearance in Utah County is proper. 
18. Motion to Quash is Granted and Order is entered on March 16, 1998. She was also 
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awarded attorney fees and costs in the sum of $200.00. 
K I lie (HIIIM mil Siiinwum •- Mnlnm IM 'SIIICIHI ( i iiiirilaiiii was signed on March 20, 1998. 
20. Stringam file Amended Complaint on Mai eh 10, 19998 naming Erin and John Patrick 
Stovall. 
21. Mvers tiled l Ibjecliion to Motion and ,\mend Complaint on March 25, 1998. Myers 
claimed the Stovalls have no interest and allowing them to be added will only cause undue delaj 
and prejudice. 
22. Strimzam fiK1 Rule 56(f) Motion to Conduct Additional Discovery prior to being require* 
to file a memo in opposition to Myer's Motion for Summary Judgment. Stringam asserted that 
through Myers claimed he sent Notice of Ddauli in stniiydin leu.miing the balloon paunenl 
neither she not her counsel received it. Stringam pointed out there were numerous issues of 
material fact in dispute, including some required additional discovery. 
representing him and the he would be representing himself. 
24 I.any Whyte submits Notice of Withdraw of Counsel on May 4 , 1$98. Myers also filed 
I\oti.«r .if'Vi ii'uli.i'i ,)\ Sumin.in iiiJunini! nil M i \ 4, 1998. 
Myers filed Answer to Stringam's Amended Complaint on May 8 ,1998. Myers denied 
each and every allegation and claimed Stringam forfeited an;, ni-jil (u inlciesl i;hc ha.s in I he 
pi ,>pt"'\ h failing i«i* make the balloon payment. He also claimed he is the only person with any 
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interest in the property. 
26. A Default Certificate was entered in error on May 18, 1998, against Erin Stoval for failing 
to answer the Complaint. 
27. Erin Stovall filed an Answer on May 14, 1998. 
28. Myers filed Answer to Amended Complaint on June 28, 1998, with two Counterclaims. 
He sues for Quiet Title against Stringam because she hasn't yet paid the balloon payment. And he 
sues for eviction and damages, claiming she is unlawful detainer of the property. He also cross-
claims for declaratory relief against Erin Stovall for the lis pendens action. 
29. Stringam filed Objection to Filing of and Motion to Strike Myers 2nd Amended Answer on 
July 14, 1998. Myers had already answered the Amended Complaint on May 8, 1998. He cannot 
file an Amended Answer without leave of Court. 
30. Myers filed Reply to the Objection to Filing of and Motion to Strike on July 28, 1998. 
The Order allowing the Amended Complaint was signed before there was an opportunity for 
hearing on the amended complaint and "therefore the same is void as in violation of the 14th 
Amendment Due Process right to an 'meaningful opportunity to be heard.'V Bodiev Connecticut, 
401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971). Myers then moved the Court for an order vacating the March Order. 
He also claims the amended Complaint is a procedural nonentity, making the Answer a nonentity 
as well. 
31. John Patrick Stovall filed Answer to Amended Complaint on September 14, 1998. 
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32. Morris Myers and Patrick Stovall filed Joint Motion for Summary Judgment on September 
22, 1998, contending that the'balloon payment was due but was not paid, and this was a material 
breach. 
33. The parties appeared before Judge Eyre on October 7, 1998. The parties stipulated to 
allow Myers to amend his answer and counterclaim, and the Court denied the Motion to Strike. 
Trial was set for February 9-10, 1999. 
34. Stringam filed Answer to John Patrick StovalPs Counterclaims on October 2, 1998. 
35. Erin Stovall filed Response to the Motion for Summary judgement on October 5, 1998. 
She did not object to summary judgment being entered as long as her interest is not damaged. 
36. Stringam filed a Rule(f) Motion to Conduct Additional Discovery in Order to Supplement 
her Opposition to the Joint Motion for Summary Judgment. Myers and Stovall had not provided 
documents showing how and when Stovall's interest in the property was transferred to Myers. 
There are factual issues precluding Summary Judgment. 
37. Notice to Submit on Joint Motion for Summary judgment is filed on October 16, 1998. 
38. The Rule(f) Motion to Conduct Additional Discovery was Granted .by the Court on 
October 26, 1998 in Memorandum Decision. Stringam has until December 1, 1998 to file a 
responsive pleading. At that time either party could file a Notice to Submit the Motion for 
Decision. 
39. Order on Stringam's Motion to Strike Myer's Amended Answer is signed by the Court on 
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November 12, 1998. The^parties stipulated to allow Myers to file his amended Answer. The 
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Court agreed that this would be the final amended Answer and Counterclaim to be filed. 
40. Stringam filed Supplemental Memo in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment 
on December 1, 1998. Stringam lists several factual issues. The nature of the agreement is in 
dispute: (1) the text of the agreement does not reflect that is was a join venture agreement. It was 
a real estate purchase agreement between Erin Stovall and the Stringams. (2) Myers has not 
produced an assignment from Erin Stovall. (3) Myers has produced an alleged assignment and 
deed from John Patrick Stovall, but there is an issue of fact as to whether or not he is the owner 
of the agreement or has any rights, since the divorce decree gives Erin the right to Vi of all 
amounts received from the home over $109,000.00. 
A second factual issue related to the balloon payment amount. Stringam claims she owes 
$109,000.00, Myers claims $134,000.00. The language in the contract is ambiguous. Neither 
Stovall nor Myers were parties to the agreement. There is no evidence that Erin transferred her 
interest to Patrick Stovall. Furthermore, any statement from Myers regarding the parties' original 
intent are not admissible because he was not present. Finally, even Patrick. Stovall cannot provide 
a payoff atnount. He did admit that Myers drafted the original agreement, so any ambiguities 
should be construed against Myers. 
The final factual issue concerns the balloon payment. In spite of Myer's claims that 
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Stringam defaulted, she did tender the funds to the Court and she asked to do this several days 
before it was necessary. 
41. Stringam filed Motions to Compel against Patrick Stovall and Myers on December 21, 
1998. The motion against Myers specifically targets paragraph 14 of his allegation that he has 
been responsible for the payment of $238.00 of the mortgage. Stringam asks that judgment by 
default be entered against Myers and that he be prohibited from introducing evicjence regarding 
paragraph 14 unless he responds to the interrogatories within 10 days of the Order. 
42. Myers filed Memo in Opposition to the Motion to Compel on December 22, 1998. Myers 
claimed that Stringam has conducted discovery in a manner to harass, inconvenience and injure 
Myers. He rests on the argument that Stringam is in default and has not paid the balloon payment 
that is owed. 
43. Stringam filed Motion for Summary Judgment against Morris Myers on December 24, 
1998. Stringam argued that Myers may not assert greater right than was granted to him by 
Patrick Stovall. Myers claims he received his right to the property from Patrick Stovall. Thus 
any right he had to the property is no greater than the right Patrick StovalLhad. Stringam asks for 
Summary Judgment that Myer's right is no greater than the right granted by Patrick Stovall. 
44. Stringam filed Motion for Summary Judgment against John Patrick Stovall on December 
24, 1998. Stringam argues that any interest Mr. Stovall has was assigned to Myers. 
45. Stringam filed Offer of Judgment on December 28, 1998, offering $ 150,000 for which 
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judgment could be entered. Defendant would agree to pay costs. 
46. Myers filed Memo in Opposition to the Motion to Compel on December 18, 1998. He 
relies on the argument that Stringam failed to pay the balloon payment and is in default. He also 
argues contract law, i.e. that a court may not rewrite a term of a contract by interpretation when 
the meaning is clear. He claims the agreement concerning the balloon payment was clear and 
unambiguous. 
47. Stringam files Replies to Myers' and StovalPs Opposition to the Motions to Compel. 
Myers complains that the requests are abusive, harassing and inconvenient, nevertheless Stringam 
has made only one request for interrogatories that was calculated to discover admissible evidence. 
The objection is without sufficient grounds. The request are proper. Stringam questions what 
legal right Myers has to the property in question, what other reasons Myers is alleging the he has 
in support of his counterclaim and what evidence he has that he has been making the mortgage 
payments. 
48. Counsel for Erin Stovall filed Motion to Continue on January 25, 1999, asking that the 
dates be continued because he is a Utah State Senator and cannot prepare or attend pre-trial 
conferences for the trial. The Court later granted the Motion and charged that the trial dates to 
April 4, 1999. 
49. Myers filed Application to the Clerk for Certification of Default pursuant to Rule 55 (d), 
claiming Stringam failed to reply to his Counterclaims. 
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50. Myers' Certificate of Default was entered on February 2, 1999. 
51. Stringam filed Request for Ruling on her Motions for Summary Judgment against Myers 
and Stovall and Motions to Compel against Myers and Stovall. 
52. Stringam filed Motion to Set Aside Default on March 24, 1999. Stringam argued that 
when Myers fourth amended answer was filed, she had asked in her objection that she would be 
relieved of any obligation to answer the pleading, since the issues had already bqen answered 
before. The understanding of Laramie Merritt, who was in oral arguments, was that Stringam 
was not to file additional pleadings after the amended answer. Furtherjnore, the allegations in the 
counterclaim have been answered. In addition, Rule 5(a)(1) requires every paper, motion, notice, 
etc. be served on all parties. Myers was not relieved of that duty until "after the entry of default." 
Myers should have served Stringam. Stringam has shown more than good cause for setting the 
entry of default aside. 
53. Stringam filed Answer to the Amended Answer and Counterclaim on March 24, 1999. 
Myers filed Memo in Opposition and Objection to the Motion to Set Aside Default on March 29 
,1999. Myers argued there is no showing of just cause for opening the defeult nor reasonable 
excuse for Plaintiffs failure to reply to his counterclaim. He argued further that Stringam had not 
tendered the balloon payment, not substantially complied with the agreement. 
54. The parties appeared before the Court on March 31, 1999. Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgement concerning Mr. Stovall was granted. Summary Judgement concerning Mr. 
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Myers, and Mr. Myers Motion for Summary Judgement were taken under advisement. 
55. The Court entered a Memorandum Decision on April 12, 1999, where Plaintiffs Motion 
to Set Aside was granted. The summary Judgement concerning Mr. Myers, and Mr. Meyers 
Motion for Summary Judgement were denied. 
56. Stringam filed a Notice of Intent to Use Prior Criminal Convictions for Impeachment 
Purposes on April 23, 1999. 
57. Myers filed a Motion to Strike and Vacate the Ruling of October 28, 1997, on June 23, 
1999, claiming that he was denied due process. Myers argued the discrepancy between the 
$109,000 determined by the court, and $134,000 the alleged correct figure, amounted to the 
Court rewriting the terms of the agreement. 
Stringam filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Myer's Motion to Strike, on July 8, 1999. 
Stringham asserted that Myers' due process rights were not violated because he did have notice, 
and order was not in error. 
58. The case came before the Court for trial on June 28, 1999. Counsel for Erin M. Stovall 
submitted Closing Arguments on July 2, 1999. Counsel for Jeannie Stringham submitted Closing 
Arguments, and Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions on July 19, 1999. Myers never submitted Closing 
Arguments. 
59. Myers submitted his Post-trial Motions and supporting memorandum on July 15, 1999. 
Myers asserts that Plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed because she has shown no right to 
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relief Further Myers moves the court for an order striking the testimony of Plaintiffs expert 
(accountant), claiming that the parties intent is the best evidence to establish the terms of the 
contract, and that the contact is not ambiguous. Myers further moves the Court for an order that 
said contact and all rights of the plaintiff thereunder, are forfeited since she didn't make the 
balloon payment. Myers asks that the evidence and testimony as to his embezzlement conviction 
be stricken, as it illustrates no criminal conduct or mortal turpitude, while being prejudicial. 
Finally Myers asks for an order releasing the copy of Petition for Writ of Certiorari to him. 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Myers' Post-trial Motions was filed July 29, 1999. 
Myers' Reply was submitted on August 10, 1999. 
60. Plaintiffs response to Erin M. Stovall's Closing Arguments were filed on August 4, 1999. 
61. Plaintiffs Counsel submitted a Request for Ruling on August 23, 1999. 
The Court entered a Ruling as to Myers Post-trial Motions on September 8, 1999. The Court 
denied Myers' Motion to Dismiss the claim as unsupported. The Court denied Myers' request for 
an Order striking the testimony of Plaintiff s expert witness. The Court also refused to find that 
Plaintiffs rights has been forfeited under the contract. Furthermore, the Court denied 
Defendants Motions to find that Plaintiff did not tender the balloon payment, and motion to 
strike the evidence as to his embezzlement convictions. The Court granted Myers' request for the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to be released to himself. Finally the Court denied the Defendant's 
Motion to Vacate the Order of October 28, 1997. Myers still filed no Closing Arguments a 
15 
requested by the Court, but has appealed rulings on motions, rather than waiting for final ruling 
and judgement. 
DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS 
At issue in this case is whether the agreement entered into between the parties constituted 
a joint venture or a lease/option to buy. Testimony was presented at trial that Ms. Stringam, and 
Ms. Stovall, believed the agreement to be a lease/option to buy. Mr. Myers and Mr. Stovall 
assert that the agreement was a joint venture. Mr. Myers drafted the agreement and therefore, 
according to case law ambiguities should be construed against Mr. Myers. Trolley Square Assoc. 
v. Nelson 886 P 2d 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The fact that ambiguities are interpreted against the 
drafter's interests, supports the position that this contract is a lease/option to buy. 
Likewise, the language of the contact supports the position that the contact is a lease/option to 
buy. "Second party agrees to sell and First Party agrees to buy said real property". This language 
taken on its face seems to indicate a lease/option to buy. Finally, Ms. Stovall who has no interest 
in the interpretation of the agreement, also believed the contact to be a lease/option to buy. The 
language of the contact, and the intention and actions of the parties, establish that the agreement 
was to lease/option to buy. 
Being a lease/option to buy contract, Ms. Stringam has the right to purchase the property 
herself by paying the balloon payment. The Court finds Ms. Stringam is not in default for failing 
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to make the balloon payment. Ms. Stringam attempted numerous times to try to ascertain the 
amount required for the balloon payment. Ms. Stringam went further and made offers to 
Defendant Myers for the balloon payment. Myers continually avoided the Plaintiff and refused to 
let her perform her obligation under the agreement. According to Utah Code Ann.§ 78-27-1; 
An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument or 
specific personal property is, if not accepted, equivalent to the actual production and 
tender of the money, instrument or property. 
Myers cannot frustrate an attempt by Stringam to perform and then fault her for failing to 
perform. Forfeiture is a harsh remedy and should not be imposed where Defendant's own acts 
caused delays. Plaintiff began well ahead of the due date to ascertain the balloon amount, 
therefore Ms. Stringam has the right to make balloon and perform on the contract. 
The balloon payment amount has been the subject of much controversy. Defendant has 
made assertions that the calculation for the balloon payment was one that anyone could do. 
Defendant testified he failed to give them a sum foe the balloon payment and stated "....Well, I 
thought you could compute it yourself. Trial transcript June 28, 1999 pg 49 line 14. Contrary 
to Mr. Myers' testimony it appears that even he himself had difficulty determining the sum. The 
numbers quoted in documents submitted to the court, varied with at least four differing sums 
named. The Court has established that the sum is ambiguous and evidence and expert testimony 
regarding the calculation was proper. The calculation for the balloon payment is further 
complicated by the nature of the agreement, that of a lease/option to buy with negative 
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amortization. Jude Eyre determined the payment to be a minium of $109,000 in the order on 
October 28, 1997. Mr. Myers asserts that taking into account the negative amortization, the true 
payment is $134,618.57. Plaintiff argue the balloon payment should be set at $104,211.75. 
Plaintiff support this assertion under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-3, which requires that if an 
objection "... is to the amount of money, terms of the instrument or the amount or kind of 
property, he must specify the amounts, terms or kind which he requires, or be precluded from 
objection afterwards". Plaintiff contend that since Ms. Stringam made a valid legal tender offer of 
$104,211.75, and that Mr. Myers failed to specify the amount of money required in his objection. 
Since he did not specify the amount Plaintiff argues he is bound by the amount of Plaintiffs tender 
offer. 
Regarding Ms. StovalPs interest in the property, the Court earlier ruled through summary 
judgement that the interest Mr. Stovall had in the property was assigned to Morris Myers. 
However through the divorce decree of Mr. And Mrs. Stovall, Mrs. Stovall retained an interest in 
the property constituting Vi of all proceeds received for the property over $109,000. "...Plaintiff 
is awarded an equitable lein against the American Fork property in the sum of one-half of all 
proceeds received in excess of $109,000, which lein should become payable upon the sale of the 
real property". Therefore if the amount of the balloon payment is over $109,000 there is the issue 
of whether Mrs. Stovall has an interest in Vi of those proceeds. Mr. Myers has asserted that the 
amount of the balloon payment should be $134,618.57. Mr. Myers asserts that Ms. Stovall has 
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no interest in the amount of the proceeds received above $109,000, in that the true selling amount 
is $109,000, and the amount above that equal to $134,618 57 is simply the interest resulting from 
the negative amortization It is consistent that any amount over the selling price due to interest 
accrued as a result of the negative amortization, still constitutes proceeds of the sale Therefore 
Ms Stovall is entitled to Vi of the balloon payment amount over $109,000 
Plaintiffs expert witness, an accountant offered another sum computed from his 
understanding of the contract terms and the added another element of the negative amortization 
Based on his interpretation, the Court determines the balloon payment to be $134,043 24, as of 
August 1, 1997 Plaintiff continued to pay $800 00 per month until December 1997, when she 
began paying $ 1038 00 per month Plaintiffs pay off as of January 1, 2000 is $141,547 21 under 
the agreement $32 547 21 represents proceeds in excess of $109,000, one half of these proceeds 
should be awarded to Ms Stovall, or $16,273 61 The first mortgage (trust deed and note) 
should be satisfied first from the $141,547 21, then Ms Stovall's award of $ 16,273 61, and the 
balance remaining should be awarded to Morris Myers 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The contract between the parties is a lease/option to buy 
2. Ms Stringam has a right to tender payment of the final balloon payment thereby 
performing and fulfilling her obligation on the contract 
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3. The amount of the balloon payment is determined to be $141,547.21, as of January 1, 
2000. 
THE COURT HEREBY DECREES AS FOLLOWS: 
1 Once Ms. Stringam has tendered the balloon payment the first mortgage (Trust Deed and 
Note) should be satisfied and Mr. Myers shall turn over marketable title to Ms Stringam 
2 One-half of all proceeds over the amount of $109,000 should be paid tp Ms Stovall in 
satisfaction of her lien/interest in the property, this amount being $16,273 61 
3. The balance then remaining after paying the Trust Deed and Ncjte and Ms Stovall, should 
be awarded to Morris Myers 
4. Due to the fact that the parties involved in this dispute contributed to or created their own 
difficulties in this matter, each party should pay their own attorneys fees and costs, with the 
exception that Plaintiffs offer of judgement in December of 1998 for $150,000 00 if accepted 
could have avoided the necessity of trial Therefore a portion of costs and attorney fees 
associated with the trial of this matter should be awarded to Plaintiff. The Court determines Ms 
Stringam should receive $12,000.00 of her costs and attorney fees, from Defendant Myers. 
DATED at Provo, Utah CU^ 3)
 L 
v 
IS/ GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
GUY R. BURNINGHAM 
Fourth District Court Judge 
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE 
To: Terry R. Spencer, Morris Myers, John Patrick Stovall 
Attorney for Defendant, Defendants Pro Se 
Please take notice that the undersigned attorney for respondent will submit the above and 
foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER to the for signature upon the expiration of five (5) 
days from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed 
prior to that time pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
/••ft- , / 
DATED this v day of / / /V CCC 6. t <\ , 2000. 
7/ 7~ 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
y y ,^ w 
TRE^TO^RVDAYES in 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL 
/IT-JUDGMENT AND ORDER, postage prepaid by first-class mail, on this ,6 day of January, 
2000, to the following: 
Terry R. Spencer 
Attorney at Law 
140 West 9000 South, Suite 8 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Morris Myers 
P.O. Box 761 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
John Patrick Stovall 
1159 East Garfield Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
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EXHIBIT B 
C. Val Morley, Bar No. 6942 
"Trey" A.R. Dayes III, Bar No. 7504 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
Attorneys for Jeannie Stringam 
110 South Main Street 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 785-5350 
Facsimile: (801) 785-0853 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




MORRIS MYERS, ERIN M. STOVALL, 
aka ERIN M. BISNER STOVALL, JOHN 
PATRICK STOVALL, 
Defendants. 
ADDENDUM TO FINAL JUDGMENT 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 970400100 
Judge: Guy R. Burningham 
After discussion in chambers with counsel C. Val Morley on behalf of the Plaintiff, Terry 
R. Spencer on behalf of Erin Stovall appearing via telephone, and Defendant Morris Myers pro se 
appearing via telephone, for purposes of clarification the Court adds and clarifies its Findings, and 
Final Judgment and Order as follows: 
1. The ambiguity created by the negative amortization terms of the contract at issue, 
left the Court with the responsibility to determine the correct amount of the final balloon payment. 
Plaintiff argued that the balloon payment amount should be set at $104,211.74 citing Utah Code 
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Ann. § 78-27-3, which requires that if an objection "...is to the amount of money, terms of the 
instrument or the amount or kind of property, he must specify the amounts, terms or kind which 
he requires, or be precluded from objection afterwards." Plaintiff asserts that since Ms. Stringam 
made a valid legal tender offer of $ 104,211.74 , and Mr. Myers failed to specify the amount of 
money required in his objection, he is bound by the amount of Plaintiff s tender offer. 
When this matter came before the Court, Mr. Myers claimed that Ms. Stringam didn't 
make the balloon payment and therefore made no tender. The Court finds that Ms. Stringam 
attempted to tender payment by the deadline specified in the contract and the Court gives Ms. 
Stringam the benefit of her proffered tender and its timeliness. Furthermore although Mr. Myers 
objected to the tender, he failed to specify the nature of his objection. Mr. Myers objection to the 
tender failed to state an amount, said amount being in dispute. Therefore the Court finds that Mr. 
Myers is precluded from objecting to the propriety of the tender because he failed to specify, the 
amount necessary to make tender sufficient. 
However, the amount of the tender was inadequate, with Ms. Stringam offering tender of 
an amount clearly insufficient. There is no waiver where a full tender is not made. Therefore, Mr. 
Myers is precluded under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-3 from making the claim that Ms. Stringam 
made no tender, but Ms. Stringam is precluded from binding Mr. Myers to the tendered amount 
where that amount and her fulfillment of the contract is in dispute. 
2. The Court finds the prevailing party in this litigation has a right to attorneys fees 
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pursuant to paragraph six of the Agreement (Exhibit A) between the parties which states in 
pertinent part: 
The parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or 
agreements herein contained the prevailing party in litigation shall be entitled to all 
costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise ro 
accrue from enforcing or terminating this contract or in obtaining possession of the 
property in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law. 
3. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this ligation and 
therefore has a right to attorneys fees and costs from December 21, 1998, the date Plaintiff 
extended to Myers her offer of judgment. 
FINAL JUDGMENT ADDENDUM 
It is hereby ORDERED ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. The amount of the Balloon payment shall remain $ 141,547.21. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys fees from December 21, 1998. 
3. Within 30 days of the entry of this order, Plaintiff shall pay $ 141,547.21 to the 
"Title Company" of her choosing with instructions to the Title Company to disburse the $ 
141,547.21 as follows: 
a. To Terry R. Spencer in trust for Erin Stovall in the amount of $ 16,273.61. 
b. To the underlying mortgage holder on the property, payment in full of the 
underlying mortgage as per lender's payoff amount. 
c. Duval Hansen Witt & Morley, P.C. in trust for Plaintiff, attorneys fees 
from December 21, 1998. 
d. To Morris Myers the remainder of funds. 
Page 3 of 6 
4. After payment of $ 141,547.21 to the Title Company, disbursement of funds by the 
Title Company, and the filing'with the Court of an Affidavit by the Title Company stating that 
funds have been distributed according to this order; title to the property at 98 West 500 North 
American Fork, Utah also know as: 
COM. SW COR BLK 52, Plat A, American Fork City SR; N 110 Ft; E 138 FT; S 
110 FT; W 138 FT to BEG., 
shall be quieted in Plaintiff, Jeannie Stringam. 
5. And it is further ordered that Plaintiffs judgment shall be augmented in the amount 
of reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or 
otherwise, or still owed after disbursement of funds, as shall be established by affidavit. 
DATED: _ ^ f f f V, 2 ^ 9 
/S/GUYR.BURNINGHAM 
Honorable Guy R. Burningam 
Fourth District Court Judge 
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE 
To: Terry R. Spencer, Morris Myers, John Patrick Stovall 
Attorney for Defendant, Defendant Pro Se 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney for the Plaintiff will submit the 
above and foregoing ADDENDUM TO FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER to the Court for 
signature upon the expiration of five (5) day from the date of this notice, plus three (3) days for 
mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration. 
DATED: fhcfoo 
DUVAL HANSEN WITT & MORLEY, P.C. 
^ T R E Y ^ X 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on (' /'ZOl /JO I caused a true and correct copy of this 
ADDENDUM TO FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER, to be mailed via first class to: 
Terry R. Spencer 
Attorney at Law 
140 West 9000 South, Suite 8 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Morris Myers 
P.O. Box 761 
Midvale.Utah 84047 
John Patrick Stovall 
1159 East Garfield Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
ORLEY, PC. 
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EXHIBIT C 
AGREEMENT 
JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT made this 1st day of August, 
1990, by and between Wade and Jeanie Stringham, of 98 West 500 
North, American Fork, Utah 84002, herein called First Party, 
and Erin M. Stovall, of 2511 South Chadwick, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84106, herein called Second Party, WITNESSETH, that 
WHEREAS, First and Second Parties are desirous of 
entering into a joint venture arrangement respecting certain 
real property at 98 West 500 North, American Fork, Utah, and 
WHEREAS, the legal and record title to said property 
is in Second Party and there is presently a trust deed incumbrance 
(ARM) against the property in favor of American Charter, of Omaha, 
Nebraska, upon which there is an approximate balance due of $105,00 
with current monthly payments of $1225; and 
WHEREAS, First Party presently occupies the property 
and the structuring of this joint venture contemplates the purchasa 
by First Party from Second Party of said property for $109,000 witr. 
deferred payments of $1038 each month commencing August 1, 1990, 
and continuing for eighty-four months and that on August 1, 1997, 
the entire balance remaining unpaid will become due and owing, 
payments to apply first to interest at the rate of 11% per annum 
and then to principal; said joint venture contemplates that First 
Party shall pay $800 each month to apply against the $1038 payment 
and Second Party shall pay the difference; and 
WHEREAS, First Party and Second Party intend hereby to 
state their intentions and agreement as to the entitlement to 
and distribution of profits in the event of sale of said property 
which is the ultimate purpose of this joint venture, and to 
provide termination and default provisions; 
NOW, THEREFORE, First Party and Second Party agree 
as follows: 
1. Second Party agrees to sell and First Party agrees 
to buy said real property;. 
2. First Party to have possession as of August 1, 1990 
3. First Party agrees to pay Second Party for the prope 
the purchase price of $109,000 on the following terms: $800 each 
month commencing August 1, 1990, for eighty-four months, and the 
entire balance remaining shall be due and payable on August 1, 199 
interest on principal amounts remaining from time to time unpaid 
shall be at the rate of 11% per annum. As aforestated, the total 
monthly payment for eighty-four months is $10^8 but of that amount 
Second Party shall pay $328 and shall also be responsible to pay 
for and maintain fire and extended insurance coverages on said 
property. 
4. Second Party agrees to pay taxes and assessments 
which become due on said property. 
5. First Party agrees that it will neither commit nor 
suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or destruction in or 
upon said property, and that First Party will maintain the propert 
in good condition. 
6. The parties agree that should either party default 
in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained the prevail 
ing party in litigation shall be entitled to all costs and expense 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue 
from enforcing or terminating this contract, or in obtaining 
possession of the property, or in pursuing any remedy provided 
hereunder or by applicable law. 
7. This agreement is binding on the heirs, executors, 
administrators, personal representatives, successors or assigns 
of the respective parties hereto. 
8. Should FIRST PARTY fail to comply with any of the 
terms hereof, SECOND PARTY shall give FIRST PARTY written notice 
specifically setting forth the provisions under which FIRST PARTY 
is in default. Should FIRST PARTY fail to cure such default 
within 30 day after said notice, SECOND PARTY may, in addition to 
any other remedies afforded SECOND PARTY by law, elect any of the 
following remedies: 
A. SECOND PARTY may be released from all obligations 
in law and equity to convey the property, and FIRST PARTY shall 
at once become a tenant at will of SECOND PARTY. All payments 
which have been made by FIRST PARTY theretofore under this 
agreement shall be retained by SECOND PARTY as liquidated and 
agreed damages for breach of this agreement; provided, however, 
that should payments of principal exceed 20% of the purchase 
price plus SECOND PARTY'S accrued interest, fair rental value, 
and a reasonable attorney's fees, then and in that event, such 
excess shall be refunded to FIRST PARTY. This remedy shall be 
available to SECOND PARTY from and after the time FIRST PARTY 
shall have paid to SECOND PARTY 33 1/3% or more of the $109,000 
purchase price. 
B. SECOND PARTY may bring suit and recover judgment 
for all delinquent installments and all reasonable costs and 
attorney's fees, and the use of this remedy on one or more 
occasions shall not prevent SECOND PARTY, at SECOND PARTY'S 
option, from resorting to this or any other available remedy in 
the case of subsequent default; or 
C. SECOND PARTY may, upon written notice to FIRST 
PARTY, declare the entire balance and accrued interest 
hereunder at once due and payable and may elect to treat this 
agreement as a note secured by a deed of trust, without 
requirement of tender of legal title to FIRST PARTYf proceed 
immediately to foreclosure in accordance with the laws of the 
State of Utah applicable to trust deeds. 
9. It is agreed that time is of the essence of 
this agreement, 
10. This agreement contains the entire agreement 
between the parties hereto. Any provisions hereof not 
enforceable under the laws of the State of Utah shall not 
effect the validity of any other provisions hereof. 
11. At such time as the property is sold the net 
proceeds of the sale shall be distributed as follows: 
A. To payment of the underlying trust deed 
indebtedness. 
B. The amount of the net proceeds as shall exceed 
$109,000 shall be divided equally between First and Second 
Parties. 
C. The amount of equity as determined by resort to 
standard mortgage payback or amortization schedule (amount, 
$109,000; amount of payment, $1038; annual interest rate, 11%; 
payment frequency, monthly) shall be paid 77% to First Party 
and 23% to Second Party. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF First and Second Parties have 




78-27-3. Objection to tender - Must be specified or deemed waived. 
The person to whom a tender is made must, at the time, specify any objection he may have to 
the money, instrument or property, or he is deemed to have waived it; and, if the objection is to 
the amount of money, the terms of the instrument or the amount or kind of property, he must 
spwCify the amounts, terms or kind which he requires, or be precluded from objection afterwards. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-27-3. 





- By check. 
- By mail. 
Conditions. 
A tender, to be good, must be free from any condition which the tenderer does not have a right to 
insist upon. Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P.2d 974 (1954). 
Interest. 
If tender is made of full face of account, and no demand for interest is made, interest, at least for the 
purposes of a tender, is waived. Hirsh v. Ogden Furn. & Carpet Co., 48 Utah 434,160 P. 283 (1916). 
Tender. 
- By check. 
Where a tender is made by check, the person to whom it is tendered must specify his objections or he 
will be deemed to have waived all objections, except such as he insists upon when tender is made. Hirsh 
v. Ogden Furn. & Carpet Co., 48 Utah 434, 160 P. 283 (1916). See also Ulibarri v. Christenson, 2 Utah 2d 
3B"7 2"'5P.2d 170 (1954). 
A check for the amount due, presented within time and when no exception is taken to the form of the 
tender, is a valid and legal tender of the amount due, but only when there are adequate funds in the 
account of the drawer to pay such check upon presentation in due course. Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d 
351, 273 P.2d 974 (1954). 
Plaintiff did not make a valid tender because it failed to fulfill a condition of the cashier's check, and 
the defendant need not have objected to the tender of the check to prevail. PDQ Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 
949 P.2d 792 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
- By mail. 
© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing™ companies. AH rights reserved. 
2 
Tender of check by mail is good tender in absence of special objections. Hirsh v. Ogden Furn. & 
Carpet Co., 48 Utah 434.160 P. 283 (1916). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 74 Am. Jur. 2d Tender § 10. 
C.J.S. - 86 C.J.S. Tender §§ 12, 17, 26, 34, 38, 43. 
© 2000 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., one of the LEXIS Publishing™ companies. All nghts reserved. 
EXHIBIT E 
1 
78-27-4. Money deposited in court. 
(1) (a) Any person depositing money in court, to be held in trust, shall pay it to the court 
clerk. 
(b) The clerk shall deposit the money in a court trust fund or with the county treasurer or city 
recorder to be held subject to the order of the court. 
(2) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules governing the maintenance of court trust funds and 
the disposition of interest earnings on those trust funds. 
(3) (a) Any interest earned on trust funds that is not required to accrue to the litigants by 
Judicial Council rule or court order shall be deposited in a restricted account. 
(b) The Legislature shall appropriate funds from that restricted account to the Judicial 
Council to: 
(i) offset costs to the courts for collection and maintenance of court trust funds; and 
(ii) provide accounting and auditing of all court revenue and trust accounts. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-27-4; L. 1990, ch. 61, § 2. 
Cross-References. - Court may order deposit upon motion, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 67. 
Defendant's deposit of tendered amount, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 68(a). 
Distribution of trust funds in district courts, Rule 6-201, Rules of Judicial Administration. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Substantial compliance. 
Defendant corporation and its officers, who deposited corporate check with clerk and arranged for 
check to be honored if presented in due course substantially complied with court order made under this 
section, even though plaintiff instead of clerk was named as payee and corporation became insolvent 
thereby causing check to be dishonored. Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 386, 472 P.2d 941 
(1969). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deposits in Court §§ 9 to 12. 
C.J.S. - 26A C.J.S. Deposits in Court §§ 5 to 7. 
A.L.R. - Funds deposited in court as subject of garnishment, 1 A.L.R.3d 936. 
Appealability of order directing payment of money into court, 15 A.L.R.3d 568. 
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